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Abstract 
This paper presents new evidence on managerial and organizational factors that explain firm level 
energy efficiency and TFP. We interviewed managers of 190 randomly selected manufacturing plants 
in the UK and matched their responses with official business microdata. We find that ‘climate 
friendly’ management practices are associated with lower energy intensity and higher TFP. Firms that 
adopt more such practices also engage in more R&D related to climate change. We show that the 
variation in management practices across firms can be explained in part by organizational structure. 
Firms are more likely to adopt climate friendly management practices if climate change issues are 
managed by the environmental or energy manager, and if this manager is close to the CEO. Our 
results support the view that the “energy efficiency paradox” can be explained by managerial factors 
and highlight their importance for private-sector innovation that will sustain future growth in energy 
efficiency. 
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The comeback of energy efﬁciency as a high-priority topic on policy and research agendas can
be attributed to two factors. First, scientists have established a causal link between global climate
change and the accumulation of manmade emissions of so-called greenhouse gases (GHG) in the
atmosphere. Climate change constitutes a serious threat to ecosystems and to the productive base
of economies around the globe (IPPC, 2007). Second, the global surge in the demand for energy,
fueled by rapid industrial take-off and changing consumption patterns in emerging economies,
has led to unprecedented increases in both the level and volatility of energy prices. As a result,
investments in energy-saving technologies have become more attractive from a business point-
of-view, both as a way of cutting running costs and as a hedging strategy. In addition, many
governments have taken to providing incentives for such investments, be it for reasons related to
climate-change or with the stated objective of reducing the dependency on energy imports.
The success of policies aiming to improve the efﬁciency and to lower the carbon intensity
of energy use depends crucially on the policy maker’s ability to predict how the business sector
responds to different regulatory measures. This is important not only because this sector accounts
for more than one third of GHG emissions in industrialized economies, but also because a large
part of the research and development (R&D) that is expected to reduce emissions in the long
run is carried out and paid for by private ﬁrms. Therefore, effective regulation must provide
incentives for both short-run measures to improve energy efﬁciency and R&D investments leading
to sustained efﬁciency growth in the future.
Clearly, any such regulation should be based on scientiﬁc evidence. Yet, researchers working
in this area have struggled to make sense of the empirical oddity that ﬁrms seem to apply irra-
tionally high discount rates when evaluating investments into energy efﬁciency. Put differently,
ﬁrms appear to systematically reject energy efﬁciency upgrades in spite of a positive net present
value that results when the “correct” risk-adjusted cost of capital is used to discount the payoff
stream associated with the project. This phenomenon has been referred to as the “energy efﬁ-
ciency paradox” or the “energy efﬁciency gap“ (e.g. Hausman, 1979; DeCanio, 1993; Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994). While there is some evidence for the existence of a paradox, the underlying fac-
tors are not yet well understood. If the paradox is driven by frictions or market failures that public
3policy can address, then the dual objectives of climate change mitigation and energy security can
be achieved by removing such frictions – possibly at little or no cost. The challenge remains to
identify all the relevant barriers to energy efﬁciency improvements.
This study uses a unique combination of survey data and ofﬁcial microdata to shed light on
this issue. Based on interviews with managers of 190 manufacturing ﬁrms in the UK we derive
performance measures for the companies’ practices in the areas of energy use and climate change.
In addition, we gather independent performance data from both ofﬁcial and commercial sources
for the ﬁrms in our sample. Based on the interview data alone, we document several aspects of
ﬁrm behavior consistent with the energy efﬁciency paradox. For example, ﬁrms report that they
could achieve substantial carbon savings without compromising on their performance. Moreover,
ﬁrmsusepaybackcriteriathatseemunreasonablyshortandsometimesdiscriminateagainstenergy
efﬁciency projects.
Using “hard” data on energy use and economic performance, we provide ample evidence that
these and other management practices have immediate repercussions on ﬁrm performance. A
summary index of climate friendly management practices is strongly positively associated with the
ﬁrm’s productivity and negatively so with its energy intensity. Moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile in the distribution of this index is associated with a 30% decrease in energy intensity,
which corresponds to almost half of the standard deviation within sectors. We show that these
results are driven by a number of speciﬁc management practices such as the implementation of
targets for energy consumption or more lenient payback criteria for energy efﬁciency investments,
as well as by investors demanding more climate friendly practices. Interestingly, we ﬁnd energy
efﬁciency to be more strongly associated with management practices than with climate policy
measures that have been implemented in the UK.
In further analysis, we address two questions related to the energy efﬁciency paradox. First, we
examine whether the mix of management practices in our sample is determined by organizational
structure. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in which climate change issues are managed by the environmental or
energy manager are more likely to adopt climate friendly management practices. Hierarchy has a
non-monotonic effect, in that the closer this manager is to the CEO the more climate friendly prac-
tices are adopted, yet this is not true if the CEO is in charge of climate change issues. Second, we
move beyond the energy efﬁciency paradox – which is about technology adoption – and analyze
4the relationship between management practices and climate friendly innovation. Climate friendly
R&D is an important outcome measure in its own right as it has the potential to reduce emis-
sions not only of the company conducting it (via process innovation) but also of the companies’
customers (via product innovation). We show that several management practices are positively
associated with climate friendly innovation. An important implication of this result is that some
of the managerial factors that facilitate energy efﬁciency investments could also promote climate
friendly innovation, thus leveraging their beneﬁcial effect.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to a series of papers
studying the “energy efﬁciency paradox” in the context of ﬁrm behavior (e.g. Ayres, 1994; De-
Canio, 1993; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).1 The failure of ﬁrms to adopt proﬁtable, energy-saving
innovations has been attributed to market failures (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) and to managerial fac-
tors such as short-run optimizing behavior or the lack of managerial resources and attention for
cost-cutting projects outside the scope of the ﬁrm’s main business(DeCanio, 1993). Case studies
of energy efﬁciency programs have shown that ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence the adoption decision
even though they should not matter in a friction-less, neo-classical world (DeCanio and Watkins,
1998b; DeCanio, 1998; Anderson and Newell, 2004). This paper improves our understanding of
the barriers to energy efﬁciency upgrades more generally as it exploits detailed data on managerial
and organizational characteristics from a random sample of manufacturing ﬁrms. In addition, our
analysis provides a deeper insight into the negative association between lean management prac-
tices and energy intensity found by Bloom et al. (2009), who did not have data on climate friendly
management practices.
The paper also addresses the role of organizational structure for the adoption of new tech-
nologies or management techniques. In theoretical work by DeCanio and Watkins (1998a) and
DeCanio et al. (2000), the speed of adoption depends to a large extent on the internal hierarchy
of the ﬁrm, irrespective of the human capital and innate ability of the individuals who form it.
Using tractable concepts of organizational structure and hierarchy we test this hypothesis in the
context of the adoption of climate friendly management practices. What is more, the paper con-
tributes to the empirical literature on environmental regulation and innovation (Jaffe and Palmer,
1997; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Johnstone, 2007), which thus far has produced very little
1The paradox has also be examined in the context of consumer choices (see Auffhammer et al., 2006, for a survey).
5evidence about the drivers of climate friendly innovation at the ﬁrm level.2
Not least, our study contributes to the further development of data gathering and matching in
this area. The principal obstacle to conducting a joint analysis of organizational structure, manage-
rial practices, energy efﬁciency, productivity and innovative activity at the ﬁrm level is the lack of
readilyavailabledata. Firm-leveldataonenergyuseissubjecttostrictconﬁdentialityrulesinmost
countries that collect them. While data on innovation is sometimes collected as part of special-
ized surveys, information on organizational structure and management practices are not reported
in ofﬁcial statistics, let alone practices that pertain to climate change issues. Asking people about
their motivations and behavior is a straightforward method of eliciting this information, but some
precautions need to be taken to avoid that respondents give biased responses (Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2001). Bewley (1999, 2002) advocates the use of loosely structured interviews instead
of questionnaires, particularly in areas where the divergence between observed behavior and the-
oretical predictions suggests that people’s objectives are not understood or that the constraints are
misrepresented. Research on the energy efﬁciency paradox as described in the literature ﬁts this
description well.3 We thus adopt the method of “double-blind” telephone interviews developed by
Bloom and van Reenen (2007), which minimizes known types of survey biases while preserving
random sampling of the respondents. This approach reconciles survey techniques and empirical
methods based on “revealed-preference” arguments by matching the survey data to “hard” data on
ﬁrm performance, in our case to the ORBIS database and to conﬁdential microdata maintained by
the Ofﬁce of National Statistics (ONS).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the
survey design in detail and explains its underlying philosophy. It also provides an overview of the
survey responses and describes the linking to business performance data. Section 3 analyzes how
energy efﬁciency and TFP correlate with management practices and policy variables measured
in the survey. Section 4 investigates the effect of organizational structure on both management
practices and ﬁrm performance. Section 5 discusses results on climate-change related innovation.
Section 6 concludes and outlines the future directions for our work.
2A recent exception is a study by Martin and Wagner (2009) on the effect of the Climate Change Levy on patent
applications by UK ﬁrms.
3For instance, Jaffe and Stavins (1994) demand that “explanations must advance beyond the tautological assertion
that if the observed rate of diffusion is less than the calculated optimal rate, there must be some unobserved adoption
costs that would modify our calculations of what is optimal” (p. 805).
62 Data
2.1 Interview design
We conducted structured telephone interviews with 190 managers at randomly selected UK pro-
duction facilities belonging to the manufacturing sector between January and March of 2009.4 The
interview setup bears close resemblance to the “double-blind” management survey design that was
developed by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) in collaboration with a major management consulting
company. The survey is conducted over the telephone as a loosely structured dialogue with open
questions that are not meant to be answered by “yes” or “no”. On the basis of this dialogue, the
interviewer then assesses and ranks the company along various dimensions. A deﬁning character-
istic of this research design is that interviewees are not told in advance that they are being assessed,
and interviewers do not know performance characteristics of the ﬁrm they are interviewing.
The interview format was designed so as to avoid several sources of bias that typically arise
in conventional surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). For instance, experimental evidence
shows that the respondent’s answers can be manipulated by making simple changes to the ordering
of questions, to the way questions are framed, or to the scale on which respondents are supposed
to answer. Bias of this kind is attributed to cognitive factors and is minimized here by asking
open questions and delegating the task of scoring the answers to the interviewer. To the extent that
interviewers are subject to cognitive bias, this can be controlled for using interviewer ﬁxed effects.
Another common observation with survey data is that respondents are tempted to report atti-
tudes or patterns of behavior that are socially desirable but may not reﬂect what they actually think
and do. This problem may be compounded in situations where respondents do not have a ﬁrm at-
titude towards the issues they are asked about but are reluctant to admit that. Our research design
addresses this issue in two ways. First, the interviewer starts by asking an open question about
an issue and then follows up with more speciﬁc questions, or asks for some examples in order to
evaluate the respondent’s answer as precisely as possible. Second, the results of the interviews are
linked to independent data on economic performance as a validation exercise.
4For additional information about the interviews see Appendix A. The complete interview structure is provided in
Appendix B.
72.2 Interview practice
Interviewees were selected at random from Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS database which provides
annual accounting data for 55 million companies worldwide.5 We restricted the sampling frame
to all UK ﬁrms that had more than 250 but less than 5000 employees in 2007. The focus on
medium-sized companies that are not household names is meant to minimize the chance that the
interviewer has prior knowledge of the company’s performance. Interviews were conducted with
the plant manager or other manager with profound knowledge of the production site such as the
production manager, chief operating ofﬁcer, the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, and sometimes the envi-
ronmental manager. Intervieweeswere emailed a letter of information in advance of the interview
which alsoassured them their answers were going to be treated as conﬁdential. On average, an
interview ran for 42 minutes.
We adopt an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 to measure management practices related to climate change.
Foreachaspectofmanagementrankedinthisway(seesection2.3belowforadetaileddescription)
interviewers ask a number of open questions. Questions are ordered such that the interviewer starts
with a fairly open question about a topic and then probes for more details in subsequent questions,
if necessary. We further provide exemplary responses that guide interviewers as to giving a high
versus an intermediate and a low score for the relevant dimension. The goal is to benchmark the
scoring of ﬁrms according to common criteria. For instance, rather than asking the manager for a
subjective assessment of the management’s awareness of climate change issues, we gauge this by
how formal and far-reaching the discussion of climate change topics is among senior managemers.
In order to check the consistency interviewer scoring many interviews were double-scored
by a second team member who listened in.6 We called 765 manufacturing ﬁrms of which 132
refused to participate straight away. In the remaining 443 cases interviewers were asked to call
back at another time but did not follow up after the target number of interviews had been achieved.
Counting only interviews granted and refused explicitly, we obtain a response rate of 59%.7
5See http://www.bvdep.com
6For a discussion of the results, see Appendix A.2.
7This is comparable to the 54% response rate obtained in Bloom and van Reenen (2007).
82.3 Interview scope
The interviews seek to gather information on three main factors concerning the effectiveness of
climate change policies. First, we wish to understand the drivers behind a ﬁrm’s decision to reduce
GHGemissions. Second, wewanttolearnaboutthespeciﬁcmeasuresﬁrmsadoptbothvoluntarily
and in response to mandatory climate change policies. This includes technology adoption and
innovation. Finally, we want to assess the relative effectiveness of various measures.
Table 1: Interview summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mean total number
1 manager's tenure in post 189 5.22 5.25 1 0 190
2 manager's tenure in company 190 12.20 10.10 0 0 190
3 awareness of climate change score 188 3.45 1.08 2 0 190
4 climate-change related products score 188 1.77 1.20 2 0 190
5 stringency of ETS target score 27 2.85 1.32 6 0 33
6 ETS target (in percent) 10 11.50 14.20 22 1 33
7 21 2.10 1.34 12 0 33
8 stringency of CCA target score 68 3.57 1.01 5 0 73
9 CCA target (in percent) 47 13.10 11.80 25 1 73
10 171 2.60 0.95 19 0 190
11 187 1.11 0.42 3 0 190
12 customer pressure score 188 2.60 1.25 2 0 190
13 investor pressure score 175 2.57 1.40 15 0 190
14 energy monitoring score 186 3.49 1.37 4 0 190
15 energy consumption targets score 183 2.90 1.40 7 0 190
16 energy consumption target (in percent) 109 22.20 17.30 22 1 132
17 GHG monitoring score 183 2.14 1.27 7 0 190
18 GHG emissions targets score 165 1.56 1.13 25 0 190
19 GHG emissions target (in percent) 25 21.70 24.50 12 0 37
20 target enforcement score 185 2.52 1.43 5 0 190
21 measures on site score 183 3.04 1.08 7 0 190
22 96 12.80 13.80 94 0 190
23 42 15.50 18.90 148 0 190
24 1 1 . 189 0 190
25 140 2.11 1.08 48 2 190
26 149 2.86 0.63 41 0 190
27 183 3.25 1.19 5 2 190
28 process innovation score 181 2.28 1.10 7 2 190
29 product innovation score 176 2.06 1.29 11 3 190
30 purchasing choices score 178 2.51 1.29 12 0 190
31
138 8.82 8.60 52 0 190
32 further reductions technologically achievable 128 27.70 20.00 62 0 190
33 adaptation to climate change score 174 1.32 0.75 16 0 190














rationality of behaviour on ETS market 
score
competitive pressure due to climate change 
score
competitive relocation due to climate change 
score
energy reduction achieved through one 
recent measure
GHG emissions reduction achieved through 
one recent measure
hurdle rate used for investments in energy 
efficiency improvement score
payback time used for investments in energy 
efficiency improvement score
barriers to investments in energy efficiency 
score
Research and Development - broad 
innovation score
further reductions achievable at current 
prices
Table 1 provides an overview of managers’ responses. It summarizes the mean, standard de-
viation, maximum and minimum values of each raw score and reporting the number of managers
9who refused to answer or did not know. Responses ranked on an ordinal scale may not be compa-
rable across questions as in some cases all ﬁrms where given scores between 2 and 4 or 1 and 3.
To normalize those responses, we computed z-scores by subtracting from the raw score the aver-
age score and dividing by the standard deviation. Histograms of the z-scores constructed for each
question are presented in Figure 3 in Appendix A. In the remainder of this section we explain
selected questions of the interview in more detail and highlight patterns in the raw data which
speak to the energy efﬁciency paradox and to the role of policies and management practices in
explaining it.
Awareness. The interview begins with a question about the management’s awareness of cli-
mate change issues. For a medium score we expect some evidence of a formal discussion, e.g. that
this has been on the agenda of a management meeting. A high score is given only if it is evident
that the management has studied the implications of climate change in detail and that the ﬁndings
have been integrated into the strategic business plan. We record if climate change is perceived as
having a positive impact. More speciﬁcally, we want to know whether climate change could be
a business opportunity. We thus ask whether the ﬁrm sells climate-change related products and
about their importance in revenue.
Government policies. Firms covered by the UK Climate Change Agreements (CCA)8 and/or
the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are asked how stringent these policies are and about
their behavior on the permit markets. What is more, we ask about participation in voluntary
policies offered by the British government such as the Carbon Trust (CT) energy audits9 and
online tools, the Enhanced Capital Allowance (ECA) scheme,10 and whether these initiatives were
perceived as useful.
The ﬁrms in the sample were exposed to a broad range of compulsory and voluntary climate
8The CCA is a voluntary agreement that offers participating ﬁrms an 80% discount on their tax liability under
the Climate Change Levy (CCL) if they promise to reduce their energy consumption. See Martin et al. (2009) for a
plant-level analysis of its causal impacts on energy use and economic performance.
9SetupbytheUKgovernmentin2001asanindependentcompany, theCarbonTrusthelpsbusinessestocutcarbon
emissions, to save energy and to commercialize low carbon technologies. Among the various services it offers to ﬁrms
and to the public sector are free energy audits. An independent consultant identiﬁes energy-saving opportunities and
supports their practical implementation. If capital expenditure is necessary, the consultant calculates the payback
period. A facility’s carbon footprint can also be calculated.
10This scheme was introduced by the UK government in 2001 as part of the Climate Change Levy Programme.
It grants ﬁrms a 100% ﬁrst-year capital allowance against taxable proﬁts on investments in equipment that meets
energy-saving criteria. The list of criteria for each type of technology is maintained by the Carbon Trust. The Trust
maintains a second list with the products and technologies that are eligible for the ECA.
10policies implemented in the UK over the past decade. Out of the 190 ﬁrms, 33 were in the EU
ETS, 73 were in a CCA and 27 participated in both schemes. Regarding voluntary policies we ﬁnd
that 131 ﬁrms had received an energy audit from the Carbon Trust and 27 ﬁrms took advantage
of the ECA. Furthermore, 41 ﬁrms used online tools provided by the Carbon Trust, 8 received
innovation grants from this institution and 10 adopted the Carbon Trust standard.
Competitive pressure. To assess the relative impact of climate change policies on competi-
tion at home and abroad, we inquire about the relative standing of a ﬁrm compared to domestic
competitors and whether regulation has induced the ﬁrm to consider relocation to unregulated
countries.
Other drivers. We ask about the role of consumers on the one hand and investors on the other
hand in driving management decisions relevant to climate change. When told that consumers or
investors demand climate friendly products and practice, the interviewer gauges the extent of the
pressure by inquiring about the information that they demand in order to be convinced (e.g. a mere
label vs. hard data on GHG emissions).
Monitoring and targets. A number of questions relate to the ﬁrm’s rigor in monitoring its
energy use and GHG emissions. Monitoring can range from a glance at the energy bill (lowest
score) to detailed monitoring of both energy use and carbon ﬂows embodied in the ﬁrms products
and intermediate goods. To be given the highest score, a ﬁrm needs external veriﬁcation of those
ﬁgures. If monitoring is in place, we ask whether management is given speciﬁc targets for en-
ergy use and for GHG emissions. We inquire about the stringency of such targets and about the
incentives provided to achieve them.
Roughly two thirds (125) of the ﬁrms in our sample have targets for energy consumption (17
of which are expenditure targets, the others being quantity targets). The percentage reduction in
energy consumption to be achieved over the next ﬁve years has a mean of 22.2% and a standard de-
viation of 17.3. For comparison, the average reduction in energy consumption that ﬁrms achieved
through a single recent measure is 12.8%. The average stringency of these targets is estimated at
2.9 and the average rigor of energy monitoring at 3.49.
Targets on GHG emissions are much less frequent. Only 37 ﬁrms have such a target, of which
only 11 also include indirect GHG emissions. Emission reduction targets for the next 5 years
average at 21.7% with a standard deviation of 24.5. Both target stringency and monitoring scores
11are lower than in the case of energy consumption targets. Further, the distribution of the energy
monitoringscoreisleft-skewedwhereastheoneforGHGmonitoringisright-skewedandbimodal.
GHG emission reducing measures. We inquire about concrete measures taken on site to reduce
GHG emissions. We ask the manager to discuss the measure that had the biggest impact in more
detail, how the ﬁrm learned about the measure and what motivated its adoption. In regards to the
debate about the “energy efﬁciency gap” we are also interested in measures that were considered
but eventually not adopted. We ask the manager about the reasons for this decision and record the
hurdle rate or payback criterion as well as other factors if they were relevant.
The responses provide new evidence on the energy efﬁciency paradox. The score capturing
the payback criteria for energy efﬁciency investments averages at 2.11 with a standard deviation
of 1.08 (cf. row 25 of Table 1). This corresponds to a payback time of 3 to 5 years. To put this
into perspective, recall that a project with a 4-year payback and constant annual cash ﬂow over a
15-year lifetime has an internal rate of return (IRR) of 24%. This appears rather high in view of
the fact that the typical energy efﬁciency investment involves a known technology (e.g. upgrading
a boiler, compressed air system or lighting system) and generates a stream of cost savings at a
very low risk (DeCanio, 1998). While this ﬁnding is consistent with other evidence on the energy
efﬁciency paradox, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms apply the same payback criteria
to energy efﬁciency projects as to other projects. In fact, two thirds of the 149 respondents told
us that the payback criteria for energy efﬁciency projects and those applied to other cost-cutting
projects are equally stringent. Of the remaining ﬁrms, some adopt more lenient payback criteria
for energy efﬁciency projects, whereas others discriminate against them.
When asked about the potential for future GHG abatement, managers said that they could cut
GHG emissions by another 8.8% on average (median 6.5%), “without compromising on the ﬁrm’s
economic performance”. In other words, a sizable amount of GHG abatement could be achieved
at zero incremental cost. Of the 139 ﬁrms that answered this question, only 21 answered that they
have exhausted such possibilities (i.e. 0% reduction). This ﬁnding speaks directly to the energy
efﬁciency paradox and provides a sense of the magnitude of the inefﬁciencies to be captured.
Organizational structure. Previous research on energy efﬁciency points to a possible effect of
organizationstructureonmanagementofclimatechangeissues. Wecollectinformationonthetitle
andresponsibilitiesofthehighest-rankingmanagerdealingwithclimatechangeandenergyissues,
12his distance from the CEO and any recent change in this position. We discuss this information in
detail in Section 4 below.
Innovation. WedistinguishbetweenthreedimensionsofR&D.Weﬁrstaskquestionsaboutthe
importance of R&D in the ﬁrm globally. Next, we inquire about climate-change related projects
that speciﬁcally aim at reducing GHG emissions in the production process. Finally, we discuss
innovation of products that would allow a ﬁrm’s customers to reduce GHG emissions in their use.
For each type of innovation, we record its geographical concentration in the ﬁrm, the magnitude
and the motivation behind it and ask about possible other environmental beneﬁts from this type of
R&D.
Most of the ﬁrms in our sample undertake some form of R&D activity. Interestingly, the
distribution of the “climate-change related process innovation” score is right-skewed with the
majorityofﬁrmsscoringbelowthemean. Weﬁndthatonlyaminorityofﬁrmsengagein“climate-
change related product innovation”. Among those who do, the distribution of this measure is
approximately symmetric.
Other measures. We inquire about other ways in which the ﬁrm reduces GHG emissions
such as clean investment options and voluntary carbon offsetting programs. We also record any
measures the ﬁrm has taken to adapt to actual or expected impacts of global climate change.
2.4 Summary indices
In regards to exploiting the interview data for multivariate analysis, we construct summary indices
in order to aggregate the vast amount of information we gathered and to deal with inevitable
collinearity in the responses. A summary index is constructed for each of the overarching themes
addressed in the interview. Table 2 provides a graphical representation of the construction of each
summary index and explains how these indices are aggregated up to obtain an overall index of
climate-friendliness. Each index is constructed as an unweighted average of the underlying z-
scores, and the overall index is constructed as an unweighted average of all summary indices.11
The relevance of each of the components will necessarily differ across sectors. In the regressions
below, we include sector dummies (at the 3-digit SIC level) to control for systematic differences
11The “barriers” and the hurdle rate z-scores are multiplied by -1 to reﬂect the fact that a more stringent criterion
for investments in energy efﬁciency translates into a higher score but reduces the “climate friendliness” of the ﬁrm.
13Table 2: Construction of summary indices
QUESTIONS sign index overall index
awareness of climate change score +
awareness + Climate-change related products score +
positive impact of climate change +
participation in ETS (0/1) +
ETS +
stringency of ETS target score +
ETS target (in percent) +
Length of participation +
+
participation in CCA(0/1) +
CCA +
stringency of CCA target score +
CCA target (in percent) +
Length of participation +
competitive pressure due to climate change score +
competitive Pressure +
competitive relocation due to climate change score +
customer pressure score +
other drivers +
investor pressure score +




energy monitoring score +
energy consumption targets score +
energy consumption target (in percent) +
Length of target existence +
Target enforcement score +
GHG targets presence (0/1) +
GHG targets +
GHG monitoring score +
GHG emissions targets score +
GHG emissions target (in percent) +
Length of target existence +
Target enforcement score +
Carbon Trust energy audit participation (0/1) +
CT Audit +
Carbon Trust energy audit (how long ago) +
Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme participation (0/1) +
Enhanced Capital Allowance + Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme (how long ago) +
Research and Development - broad innovation score +
innovation + process innovation score +
product innovation score +
measures on site score +
hurdle rate for energy efficiency investments score -
payback time for energy eff. investments score +
barriers to investments in energy efficiency score -
rationality of behaviour on ETS market score
Notes: Indices are constructed as averages of the z-scores for the answers with weights 1 or -1.
The awareness index includes both the awareness z-score, a dummy for whether or not the manager mentioned a
positive impact of climate change and the climate-change related products z-score. The ETS and CCA indices are
constructed as the average of the normalized target, length of participation, participation and the z-scores for regula-
tory stringency. Rationality of market behavior is also included for the ETS. The competitive pressure index combines
the competitive pressure and relocation z-scores, while the “other drivers” index averages the z-scores for customer
and investor pressures.
We devise two separate indices for targets pertaining to energy use and GHG emissions. Both are constructed as the
mean of the respective z-scores for the presence of a target existence, percentage reduction, the stringency, the time
it has been in place, as well as monitoring and enforcement. We also compute a comprehensive targets index as the
simple mean of both indices.
The Carbon Trust energy audit and the ECA are voluntary policies. The corresponding indices are based on a binary
measure of participation and the number of years that have passed since the ﬁrm participated. Finally, we compute an
innovation index as the mean of the z-scores for product innovation, process innovation and general R&D intensity.
Table displays descriptive statistics for all indices along with those for the productivity variables contained in the
ORBIS database.
The Overall Index of Climate-Friendliness is computed as the unweighted average of sub-indices.
14Table 3: Descriptive statistics of ORBIS matched dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
mean p10 p25 p75 p90
ORBIS variables
183 11.600 1.23 10.30 10.80 12.30 13.30
184 6.190 0.97 5.27 5.59 6.77 7.51
188 10.400 1.52 8.52 9.48 11.40 12.40
153 10.800 1.33 9.31 9.91 11.60 12.60
Survey indices
overall climate friendliness index 190 -0.110 0.41 -0.65 -0.43 0.16 0.43
awareness index 190 0.014 0.69 -0.74 -0.43 0.18 1.04
ETS index 175 -0.310 0.58 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 0.55
CCA index 172 -0.340 0.73 -0.93 -0.93 0.36 0.80
competitive pressure index 189 0.022 0.85 -1.03 -0.47 0.09 0.81
other drivers index 189 0.032 0.85 -1.19 -0.78 0.70 1.10
energy targets index 190 -0.130 0.76 -1.28 -0.91 0.48 0.69
GHG targets index 189 -0.091 0.67 -0.78 -0.77 0.34 0.94
Carbon Trust energy audit index 181 -0.250 1.01 -1.73 -1.73 0.47 0.73
Enhanced Capital Allowance index 166 -0.160 0.76 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 0.90
innovation index 184 -0.008 0.77 -1.03 -0.46 0.62 1.09








materials (ln(cost of goods - wage bill))
 
Notes: Summary statistics for the 190 firms from the survey. The first four variables are obtained from the Orbis dataset of Bureau Van Dijck. The survey indices are 
constructed as averages of the z-scores for various answers with weights 1 or -1, as detailed in Table 4. The overall index of climate-friendliness is computed as the 
unweighted average of sub-indices.
1
5across sectors. That is, we compare the effects of climate friendliness on outcomes within an
industry rather than across industries. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for both the summary
indices and the main performance variables in the ORBIS dataset.
Table 4: Firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mean median
1 global number of employees 17,306 47,760 2,500 116,594 141 153
2 UK number of employees 1,324 3,880 400 7,440 107 176
3 plant size 362 342 280 1,028 66 183
4 firm number of employees in 2005 * 784 873 436 2,936 122 172
5 number of sites globally 68 294 7 494 1 161
6 number of sites in UK  5 9 2 24 1 185
7 turnover (million USD - 2005) *  238 341 110 1,105 21 172
8 5,226 37,384 2,534 61,948 -24,570 175
9 age of company * 33 29 22 92 3 190
10 age of company in UK 68 54 50 183 9 178
11 number of competitors globally 39 149 6 311 1 140
12 number of competitors in the UK 11 37 4 71 0 171
13 proportion of production exported 36 34 30 86 0 169
14 proportion of inputs imported 42 33 40 98 0 151
15 number of shareholders * 5 13 2 37 1 190
16 number of subsidiaries * 4 5 2 16 0 190
17 proportion of managers 11 8 10 27 2 170
18
15 15 10 47 1 146
19
34 35 25 93 0 158
20
9,561 20,716 3,270 51,800 43 112
21
27,464 52,884 10,709 147,489 188 106
22 fraction of running costs for energy  13.90 15.80 9.00 45 1 80
23 fraction of turnover for energy  6.10 9.00 2.00 24 0 13
24 154,664 717,146 13,905 400,000 545 52












Earnings before Interests and Taxes 
(EBIT) (thousand USD - 2005) * 
proportion of employees with a 
university college degree
proportion of employees that are 
unionised
turnover of firm's global ultimate 
owner (million USD) *
firm's global ultimate owner number 
of employees (last available year) * 
site carbon pollution 
(tons of CO2)
Notes: Some variables have a missing value in the sample of the 190 interviewed firms. A star(*) denotes data available for 
some firms in Orbis. Non starred data is obtained through interviews.
2.5 Firm characteristics
The 190 interviewed ﬁrms are from different subsectors of the manufacturing sector (such as paper
mills, ship repair, semiconductors, etc.). Table 4 summarizes their main characteristics based on
16both the ORBIS data and on interview responses to part IX of the questionnaire in Appendix B.
Firm size in terms of UK employees ranges between 20 and more than 45,000,12 while global
and plant size also show a strong disparity. Seventy percent are multiunit ﬁrms, while 80% of
ﬁrms are ultimately owned by foreign multinationals of different origins such as South Africa,
Korea, France or the US. Net income and turnover, as reported in their annual accounts, show as
much variation. Firms also differ greatly in their age, with some very young ﬁrms (one year old)
and one more than two centuries. The degree of competition faced by ﬁrms both in the UK and
internationally ranges from non-existence to very high levels. Most ﬁrms export their products
and import a share of their inputs, though again the magnitudes vary widely. Union membership
varies between none and all employees, and the proportion of managers in the ﬁrm is usually
below ﬁfteen percent. Firms in the sample therefore represent a wide variety of activities, size,
proﬁtability, age, international activity and ownership.The share of energy costs in total costs was
reported by half the interviewees and ranged from 0 to 80%, while some reported energy cost
as a proportion of turnover which ranged from 0% to 32%. Total carbon emissions exhibit large
disparities across the 54 ﬁrms that reported them, ranging from less than a ton to over 400,000
tons. Of the production sites we interviewed, 68% had implemented an ISO14000 environmental
management system.
Importantly, interviewed ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly different from non-interviewed ﬁrms in
regards to the observable characteristics used in our analysis. This is shown in Panel A of Table
5 where each of the principal ﬁrm characteristics available from the ORBIS database (turnover,
employment, materials, and capital) is regressed on an dummy variable indicating that a ﬁrm was
contacted and a full set of sector and year dummies, with the result that the estimated coefﬁcients
are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. For the set of ﬁrms that either conceded or refused an
interview, we ran analogous regressions to estimate an intercept speciﬁc to ﬁrms that granted us
an interview. The results in Panel B of Table 5 show that none of these intercepts is statistically
signiﬁcant. We thus conclude that our sample is representative of the underlying population of
medium-sized manufacturing ﬁrms in the UK.
12Although we had limited the sampling frame for contact information to ﬁrms below 5000 employees, these were
in several cases sub-units of much larger companies.
17Table 5: Representativeness of interviewed ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
turnover materials
A. All firms
   firm contacted 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11
(0.44) (0.7) (0.73) (1.29)
   number of firms  6393 7359 7308 5869
   R-squared       0.56 0.56 0.65 0.65
B. Contacted firms
   firm granted interview 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.04
(0.62) (0.91) (1.46) (0.18)
   number of firms  295 316 315 273
   R-squared       0.56 0.56 0.65 0.65
employment  capital 
Notes: Regressions in panel I are based on the entire set of medium-sized firms contained in ORBIS. Each column shows the results from a 
regression of the ORBIS variable given in the column head on a dummy variable indicating whether a firm was contacted or not. Panel II 
shows analogous regressions for the set of contacted companies and with an indicator for whether an interview was granted. All regressions 
are by OLS and include year dummies and 3-digit sector dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2.6 Matching interview data to the UK production census
A distinctive feature of our research design is the effort to link the interview data with independent
performance data, both as a means of validation and to examine actual impacts. ORBIS data allow
us to derive measures of productivity and examine how they relate to various management survey
variables. We also match the ﬁrms in our sample to observations in the Annual Respondents
Database (ARD), the most comprehensive and detailed business dataset for the UK. Data access
is restricted to approved researchers working on the premises of the ONS. The ARD contains data
on energy expenditures that are of particular interest in this context. Combining look-up tables
provided by the ONS for the ORBIS and ARD datasets and information on the facilities postcode
we obtain 130 (68.4%) unique matches for the ﬁrms we interviewed.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the ARD variables in the sample of matched ﬁrms.
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. We consider two alternative measures of energy
intensity. The ﬁrst one, energy expenditures divided by variable costs, is a cost-based measure
that is insensitive to ﬁrm-speciﬁc markups. The second one is calculated as energy expenditures
dividedbygrossoutput. Ifﬁrmsadjusttheirprice-costmarkupinresponsetoachangeinthefactor
input mix, the two measures may not always give the same picture. However, the distributional
characteristics of both measures are very similar and they are highly correlated. Column 2 of
18Panel A exhibits a considerable amount of dispersion in energy intensity between ﬁrms in our
sample. After controling for 3-digit industry codes in Panel B, the standard deviation falls by only
one third. That is, most of the variation in energy intensity is driven by differences between ﬁrms
rather than industries. As the next section will show, differences in management practices go a
long way to explain this variation.
Table 6: Summary statistics ARD variables pooled sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mean  standard N median mean, mean, mean, mean,
 deviation bottom 10 % bottom 25 % top 25 % top 10 %
A. Variables
   energy expenditure over  -4.102 1.003 678 -4.087 -5.837 -5.313 -2.840 -2.139
   energy expenditure   -3.989 0.961 680 -3.997 -5.679 -5.177 -2.766 -2.148
over variable costs 
   gross output  10.726 1.243 683 10.781 8.496 9.257 12.171 12.799
   material  10.228 1.226 682 10.197 8.143 8.734 11.810 12.401
   energy expenditure   6.643 1.457 680 6.495 4.243 4.896 8.559 9.415
   employment  6.090 0.931 683 6.004 4.589 5.098 7.231 7.745
   capital  10.429 1.215 495 10.395 8.428 8.993 11.962 12.492
B. Within sector variation
   energy expenditure over  0.674 678 0.018 -1.274 -0.808 0.778 1.172
   energy expenditure   0.646 680 -0.008 -1.217 -0.756 0.777 1.168
over variable costs 
   gross output  0.844 683 0.000 -1.595 -0.974 0.977 1.535
   material  0.832 682 0.000 -1.528 -0.995 1.025 1.563
   energy expenditure   0.859 680 0.015 -1.714 -1.053 1.011 1.545
   employment  0.554 683 0.020 -1.014 -0.696 0.677 1.036
   capital  0.745 495 0.010 -1.447 -0.951 0.904 1.353
gross output 
gross output 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the ARD variables over the pooled sample, from year 2000 to 2006. All variables are in logs. Panel B summarizes the residuals from 
regressions on industry dummies at the SIC 3-digit level.  
3 Management practices and ﬁrm performance
3.1 Concepts
We are interested in two closely related measures of ﬁrm performance, namely energy efﬁciency
and TFP. In theory, ‘good management’ increases both measures. It can mitigate managerial slack
and discourage wasteful practices, thus raising output for a ﬁxed amount of factor inputs. It might
19also change production in a way that increases output by more than the necessary increment in fac-
tor inputs. ‘Good management’ is a rather general term that could be interpreted to embrace both
management practices and organizational structure. Since we wish to distinguish between these
two aspects, we formulate the working hypothesis that a ﬁrm’s organizational structure determines
its energy efﬁciency through its ability to adopt effective management practices and adequate re-
sponses to public policy. That is, the “structural model” we have in mind consists of (i) a mapping
from organizational structures into management practices and (ii) a mapping from management
practices into ﬁrm outcomes. This section provides empirical evidence on the latter mapping. The
former mapping will be the subject of Section 4 below.
3.2 Management practices and productivity
We use productivity data from the ORBIS database (summarized in Table 3) to estimate the rela-
tionship between management practices and productivity.13 Each cell in Table 7 corresponds to
a different regression of the logarithm of turnover on a single management variable and various
control variables. The cell contains the coefﬁcient estimate and standard error for the management
variable indicated in the row header, given the speciﬁcation of the respective column. The regres-
sions in the ﬁrst column includes the logarithm of employment as a control so that the coefﬁcient
on the management variable can be interpreted as the effect on labor productivity. Regressions
in the second column of Table 7 include employment, materials and capital (all in logarithms) as
additional controls.14 This is a straightforward way of estimating the correlation between TFP
and the management variable of interest. All regressions include 3-digit sector dummies, ﬁrm age
(linear and quadratic terms) and year effects. To control for interviewer noise, we also include
a full set of interviewer dummies and a dummy variable for experience indicating whether the
interviewer had conducted less than 10 interviews. As respondent’s characteristics we include
a dummy variable indicating a technical background as well as the interviewer’s assessments of
the respondent’s knowledge of the ﬁrm and of the respondent’s concern about climate change (cf.
questions X.2 and X.3 of the questionnaire in Appendix B).
The principal result in Table 7 is the strong positive association between the climate friendli-
13As was explained above, by construction we get the largest possible sample using the ORBIS data.
14The number of ﬁrms drops from 182 to 153 because some ﬁrms did not report data on capital and materials.
20Table 7: Regression results using ORBIS data
(1) (2)
Summary indices Labour productivity TFP




competitive pressure -0.05 0.01
(0.040) (0.030)




energy targets 0.225*** 0.075***
(0.050) (0.027)
GHG targets 0.237*** 0.05
(0.064) (0.034)
Carbon Trust audit 0.110** 0.03
(0.048) (0.028)






barriers to invest in  -0.099** -0.075**
energy efficient projects (0.047) (0.029)





Notes: Each panel  represents a different regression of a CEP Climate Change Management 
Survey Score and various control variables.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
logarithm of turnover. In the  first column, the logarithm of employment is included in  the 
explanatory  variables  such  as  to  capture  labour  productivity,  while  the  second  column 
approximates total factor productivity by including also the logarithm of capital and materials. 
Each panel reports the coefficient and standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) relative to each explanatory overall 
index or score included  in separate  regressions. The  number of  observations, firms  and R-
squared  vary  for  each  regression;  the  numbers  reported  are  those  of  the  regression on  the 
overall index.All regressions include firm age (linear and quadratic), 3-digit sector dummies, 
year dummies, interviewer noise controls (dummies for interviewer identity and for experience 
less than 10 interviews), and respondent characteristics (dummy for technical background, post-
interview scores for knowledge about the firm and concern about climate change issues). * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
21ness index derived from the interview responses and productivity. This correlation is statistically
signiﬁcant for both productivity measures, but the coefﬁcient is smaller when controlling for cap-
ital and materials (0.174 instead of 0.326). Among other things, climate friendliness might affect
productivity by increasing investment in capital through cleaner technologies. In this case the co-
efﬁcient in column 2 falls short of capturing the full effect on productivity since it is conditional
on capital.
The ﬁnding for climate friendliness is in line with previous work showing that ﬁrms with better
management practices are, on average, more productive (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007) and more
energy efﬁcient (Bloom et al., 2009).15 In addition, the present study sheds light on the question
of which management practices are driving this result. For example, we ﬁnd that climate change
awareness is positively correlated with TFP. Hence more productive ﬁrms are also more likely to
have climate-change related products, to expect positive impacts of climate change or to exhibit
more awareness of climate change issues among its management.
We also ﬁnd a rather strong, positive relationship between productivity and the energy targets
index measuring the monitoring of energy use, the presence and stringency of targets as well as
their enforcement. Improving the overall index of energy targets from the 25th to 75th percentile
(1.39 in Table 3) can be associated with an 11% improvement in TFP.16 This ﬁnding is striking,
as it supports the view that the simple practice of setting targets for energy use and following up
on them can have a discernible effect on a ﬁrm’s productivity.
We obtain a negative coefﬁcient on the score measuring barriers to invest in energy efﬁcient
projects (cf. question V.8.3. in Appendix B). This implies that ﬁrms that discriminate against
investments in energy efﬁciency are also less productive on average. Notice that there is no statis-
tically signiﬁcant correlation between productivity and the payback time criterion as such.
The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on GHG targets, like the ones for the Carbon Trust
audit and CCA indices, becomes insigniﬁcant once we include capital. Given the complementarity
between energy and capital, capital might act as a proxy for energy use in these regressions and
hence control for possible self-selection of energy-intensive ﬁrms into these schemes. We also
ﬁnd that TFP is positively associated with the ECA index at 10% signiﬁcance. While this result
15Related to this, Shadbegian and Gray (2003, 2006) ﬁnd a positive correlation between production efﬁciency and
pollution abatement efﬁciency in the US paper and steel industries, even after controlling for observable factors.
16exp(1:390:075) 1 = 11%
22is reassuring, the ECA and other climate policies were not implemented with the primary goal of
enhancing productivity of the business sector but to promote energy efﬁciency, to which we shall
turn in the next section.
3.3 Management practices and energy efﬁciency
As a ﬁrst approximation to the relationship between management practices, climate change poli-
cies and energy efﬁciency, we regress different measures of energy intensity on a single manage-
ment index or score and on a vector of control variables. The goal behind these regressions is to
uncover the unconditional patterns of correlation between management, policy and energy vari-
ables after correcting only for sector, time, and size effects. In Table 8, we report the results in a
similar way as in Table 7 but now having as dependent variable (the logarithm of) energy inten-
sity, deﬁned either as energy expenditure divided by gross output (in columns 1 to 3) or as energy
expenditure over non-capital expenditure (wages and materials expenditure, in columns 4 to 6).
To begin, the index of overall climate friendliness is negatively associated with energy in-
tensity. This result is robust across speciﬁcations once the 3-digit level sector dummies are in-
cluded, and it is consistent with the productivity results reported in the previous section. To
get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, we calculate by how much a ﬁrm’s energy intensity
changes, ceteris paribus, when shifting its overall climate friendliness from the 25th percentile
to the 75th percentile of the distribution. We do so by taking the interquartile range from the
ﬁfth row of Table 3 and multiplying it by the coefﬁcient in column two of Table 8, which yields
(0:16+0:43)( 0:51) =  0:30. In absolute terms, this number corresponds to almost half of
the standard deviation in energy intensity within sectors and accounts for almost one ﬁfth of the
interquartile range (cf. Panel B of Table 6). From this we conclude that the relationship found
between climate friendly management practices and energy intensity is economically signiﬁcant.
We further examine this relationship using more speciﬁc measures of climate friendliness.
The indices for competitive pressure and other drivers (consumer and investor pressure) are both
negativelyandsigniﬁcantlyassociatedwithenergyintensity, theformerindexat10%andthelatter
at 5% signiﬁcance. This suggests that ﬁrms cope with increasing pressure on both product and
capital markets by enhancing their energy efﬁciency. The coefﬁcient on innovation is negative,
too, though not statistically signiﬁcant.
23Firms with higher values on the energy consumption targets index are on average less energy
intensive when controlling for sector. This result is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% or better in
most cases. In contrast, the coefﬁcients on the index for GHG emission targets are positive and
signiﬁcant when both sector and size controls are included.
Table 8: Regressions of energy intensity on management variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary indices
overall index 0.009 -0.510** -0.461* -0.109 -0.487** -0.446**
(0.219) (0.231) (0.236) (0.215) (0.208) (0.209)
awareness -0.232** -0.187 -0.153 -0.300*** -0.234** -0.206*
(0.102) (0.118) (0.127) (0.101) (0.116) (0.122)
competitive pressure -0.263*** -0.130* -0.136* -0.275*** -0.151* -0.156**
(0.093) (0.074) (0.070) (0.089) (0.080) (0.076)
other drivers 0.017 -0.247** -0.241** -0.070 -0.279*** -0.273***
(0.117) (0.111) (0.110) (0.113) (0.105) (0.102)
innovation -0.142 -0.221 -0.133 -0.220* -0.232 -0.147
(0.122) (0.157) (0.167) (0.116) (0.157) (0.166)
energy targets 0.025 -0.313** -0.285* 0.050 -0.218* -0.194
(0.108) (0.148) (0.148) (0.104) (0.129) (0.130)
GHG targets 0.056 0.113 0.206* 0.077 0.167 0.252**
(0.109) (0.108) (0.124) (0.107) (0.110) (0.125)
Carbon Trust energy audit 0.078 -0.074 -0.079 0.065 -0.084 -0.089
(0.099) (0.081) (0.081) (0.098) (0.075) (0.074)
Enhanced Capital Allowance -0.125 -0.223* -0.235* -0.166 -0.191 -0.199*
(0.123) (0.127) (0.126) (0.116) (0.121) (0.120)
ETS 0.259* 0.115 0.205 0.230 0.051 0.123
(0.140) (0.160) (0.159) (0.139) (0.149) (0.146)
CCA 0.428*** 0.157 0.167 0.407*** 0.227 0.235
(0.131) (0.187) (0.184) (0.120) (0.178) (0.175)
barriers to invest in  0.338*** 0.398*** 0.387*** 0.381*** 0.465*** 0.460***
energy efficient projects (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.077) (0.094) (0.093)
payback time -0.010 -0.026 -0.036 -0.035 -0.042 -0.047
(0.088) (0.080) (0.083) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Controlling for
size (log employment) no  no  yes no no yes
3 digit sector dummies no yes yes no yes yes
observations 678 678 678 680 680 680
firms 128 128 128 128 128 128
energy expenditures over gross output 
ln(EE/GO)
energy expenditures over variable cost 
ln(EE/VCOST)
Notes: Each panel represents a different regression of a CEP Climate Change Management Survey Score and various control variables. Each panel 
reports the coefficient and standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) relative to 
each explanatory overall index or score  included in separate regressions. All regressions include  firm age (linear and quadratic), year dummies, 
interviewer noise controls (dummies for interviewer identity and for experience less than 10 interviews), and respondent characteristics (dummy for 
technical background, post-interview scores for knowledge about the firm and concern about climate change issues). The number of observations, firms 
varies for each regression; the numbers reported are those of the regression on the overall index. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
The indices for the two voluntary climate policies (CT energy audit and ECA) are negatively
associated with energy intensity when sector dummies are included, but only the ECA index is
statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, another ﬁnding consistent with the TFP regression.17 In contrast,
17Causality could run either way to generate this correlation. On the one hand, since the ECA is a government
subsidy for investments in energy saving equipment, the policy could be effective at improving energy-efﬁciency at
24the coefﬁcients on the EU ETS and CCA indices are positive. This can be explained by the fact
that both policies target energy intensive ﬁrms in the ﬁrst place, and the loss of signiﬁcance once
sector dummies are included speaks to the presence of a selection effect.
The last two rows of Table 8 report the coefﬁcients on two management scores relevant for the
debate about the energy efﬁciency paradox. We ﬁnd a positive and highly signiﬁcant association
between the barriers to invest in energy efﬁciency score and energy intensity. This means that, on
average, energy intensity is higher in ﬁrms that apply more stringent payback criteria to energy
efﬁciency projects than to other projects. Additionally, ﬁrms granting longer payback times are
less energy intensive, although this ﬁnding is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results are in line
with those obtained previously in the productivity regressions.
Table 9 shows that most of these results hold up when regressing energy intensity on all sum-
mary indices.18 The main difference is that the coefﬁcients on the competitive pressure and ECA
indices lose signiﬁcance whereas the results for targets on energy consumption and GHG targets
gain statistical signiﬁcance. Notably, we now ﬁnd a robust negative relationship between energy
intensity and the energy targets index and a positive one for the GHG emission targets index.
When interpreted in a causal fashion, the former result tells us that, ceteris paribus, energy tar-
gets decrease energy intensity but the latter gives rise to the startling conclusion that GHG targets
increase energy intensity. One explanation for this would be that ﬁrms must switch to more ex-
pensive fuels (e.g. from coal to gas) in order to reduce GHG emissions.19 The coefﬁcient could
be biased if we fail to control for an important determinant of the adoption of GHG targets which
is also correlated with energy intensity. It seems most plausible, however, that the issue is one of
reverse causality. Even if identical GHG emission targets were randomly assigned to some ﬁrms
and not to others (i.e. in the absence of selection) energy intensive ﬁrms are more likely to report
participating ﬁrms. Possible transmission channels could involve factors external to the ﬁrm, such as binding credit
constraints for projects that are not central to the running of their business. The ECA might help ﬁrms to relax these
constraints and thus increase investments in energy efﬁciency improvements. On the other hand, it is possible that
ﬁrms that are more conscious about curbing energy consumption are both more energy efﬁcient and more likely to
participate in policies pertaining to these goals.
18Due to missing observations for the policy indices (ECA, Carbon Trust audit, EU ETS and CCA), the number of
ﬁrms drops to 93 when running this regression. In order to avoid sample selection bias we substitute a constant for
missing values of these four indices and include dummy variables that take a value of 1 whenever a substitution is
made. Thisprocedureallowsustokeep123ﬁrmsinthesamplewhileusingthefullsampletoidentifycoefﬁcientswith
non-missing observations. Nonetheless, running the regression in the smaller sample of 93 ﬁrms gives qualitatively
very similar results that are available from the authors upon request.
19Recall that the numerator of both intensity measures is energy expenditures.
25that the target is stringent. Hence a ﬁrm’s energy intensity determines its value for the GHG index
(via the stringency score) and not vice versa. This explains why, all else being equal, ﬁrms with a
higher GHG targets index are more energy intensive on average.
Table 9: Multivariate regressions of energy intensity on management indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary indices
awareness -0.211* 0.023 0.065 -0.250** -0.065 -0.028
(0.112) (0.130) (0.119) (0.115) (0.132) (0.123)
competitive pressure -0.155* -0.042 -0.052 -0.191** -0.102 -0.111
(0.087) (0.080) (0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.075)
other drivers 0.095 -0.255** -0.301** 0.010 -0.287*** -0.328***
(0.122) (0.111) (0.116) (0.112) (0.100) (0.102)
innovation -0.022 -0.265 -0.138 -0.099 -0.265 -0.153
(0.109) (0.186) (0.160) (0.103) (0.181) (0.162)
energy targets -0.283* -0.596*** -0.572*** -0.170 -0.441*** -0.419**
(0.161) (0.167) (0.155) (0.150) (0.161) (0.161)
GHG targets 0.129 0.451** 0.479** 0.168 0.458** 0.483***
(0.173) (0.196) (0.183) (0.163) (0.180) (0.168)
Carbon Trust energy audit  0.036 -0.075 -0.066 0.018 -0.113 -0.106
(0.094) (0.072) (0.069) (0.089) (0.076) (0.072)
Enhanced Capital Allowance  -0.079 0.103 0.112 0.005 0.129 0.137
(0.265) (0.237) (0.189) (0.277) (0.228) (0.189)
ETS 0.129 0.150 0.264* 0.086 0.018 0.119
(0.143) (0.171) (0.149) (0.142) (0.157) (0.141)
CCA 0.540*** 0.293 0.248 0.458*** 0.337 0.297
(0.182) (0.200) (0.189) (0.164) (0.207) (0.202)
Controlling for
3-digit sector dummy no yes yes no yes yes
size (log employment) no no yes no no yes
observations 658 658 658 660 660 660
firms 123 123 123 123 123 123
R-squared 0.294 0.671 0.697 0.370 0.721 0.743
energy expenditures over gross output 
ln(EE/GO)
energy expenditures over variable cost 
ln(EE/VCOST)
Notes: Each column shows the results of a multivariate OLS regression of energy intensity on management indices and other control variables.  Twenty 
of the 123 firms have missing observations for one or several of the policy indices ETS, CCA, Carbon Trust energy audit and ECA. Rather than 
dropping those observations, we replace the missing values of each of these four indices by a constants and include a dummy variable for each index 
that takes a value of 1 whenever a substitution is made. This procedure allows us to use the full sample of 123 firms to identify the coefficients on 
variables without missing observations. All regressions include firm age (linear and quadratic), year dummies, interviewer noise controls (dummies for 
interviewer identity and for experience less than 10 interviews), and respondent characteristics (dummy for technical background, post-interview scores 
for knowledge about the firm and concern about climate change issues). Standard errors given in parenthesis are clustered at the firm level and robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. For the “no missing” variables, we have replaced the missing observations (don't know, not 
asked, refused to respond) by zero, and the “missing id” variables are equal to one if we have replaced a missing value for the corresponding variable 
and zero otherwise.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Next we take a closer look at the principal constituents of the indices we found to be signif-
icant. In Table 10 we regress energy intensity on the main variables underlying an index, while
controlling for all other indices. Panel A shows the decomposition of the “other drivers” index.
While both customer and investor pressure exhibit a negative correlation with energy intensity,
the coefﬁcient on the latter is more precisely estimated (the large standard errors hint at a multi-
collinearity problem). Panel B shows that the components of the energy targets index which matter
for energy intensity are energy monitoring and the presence of a target rather than its enforcement
26or its stringency.20 The results in Panel C corroborate our conjecture that the correlation between
energy intensity and the GHG index is driven by the stringency score. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrms with
the most stringent GHG emission targets are also the most energy intensive ones.21 The positive
coefﬁcient on GHG monitoring is signiﬁcant at 10% at best. Finally, Panel D shows that the ear-
lier result for the investment criteria stringency variables are robust in the multivariate regression.
The barriers to investments in energy efﬁciency score continues to be positively and signiﬁcantly
associated with energy intensity whereas the scores for payback time and measures taken on site
are negatively associated with energy intensity and less signiﬁcant.
In sum, the results presented in this section strongly support the view that differences in energy
efﬁciency across ﬁrms within a given sector are driven by measurable differences in management
practices rather than by various climate policies that have been implemented in the UK. Therefore,
for a better understanding of what is driving the energy efﬁciency paradox, we need to know what
determines the adoption of certain climate friendly management practices at the ﬁrm level. This is
the goal of the next section.
4 Doesorganizationalstructureexplainmanagementpractices?
4.1 Characterizing organizational structure
Previous research has put forth the idea that organizational structure affects a ﬁrm’s ability to im-
prove its energy efﬁciency. For instance, in theoretical models by DeCanio and Watkins (1998a)
and DeCanio et al. (2000), the ﬁrm is represented as a network of agents and the cost of com-
munication between agents depends on the number of nodes between them. When information
about novel ways of enhancing efﬁciency arrives at one end of the network, this does not translate
into better performance until the information has been transmitted to all other agents in the net-
work. Using numerical simulations for different networks, DeCanio et al. show that the optimal
organizational structure is subject to a trade-off between connectedness and communation cost.
The subsequent analysis tests a stripped-down version of this idea using a representation of
20We experimented with including the energy target stringency score in this regression both with the energy targets
dummy and without it. In neither case is this variable statistically signiﬁcant.
21When including a dummy for target existence in the regressions – by itself or along with the stringency score
– the coefﬁcients are not statistically signﬁciant when controlling for sector dummies and ﬁrm size. The results are
available from the authors upon request.
27Table 10: Multivariate regressions of energy intensity on selected survey scores and indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: other drivers 
customer pressure score 0.147* -0.211 -0.208 0.097 -0.168 -0.165 107
(0.086) (0.134) (0.130) (0.078) (0.122) (0.119) 582
investor pressure score -0.162 -0.089 -0.107 -0.226** -0.178* -0.195**
(0.102) (0.099) (0.102) (0.088) (0.091) (0.092)
R-squared 0.280 0.659 0.670 0.370 0.708 0.720
Panel B: energy targets
energy monitoring score 0.029 -0.370** -0.323** 0.063 -0.252* -0.199 112
(0.108) (0.142) (0.135) (0.104) (0.139) (0.125) 610
energy targets dummy -0.163 -0.268** -0.233** -0.128 -0.210** -0.171*
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.100) (0.091) (0.092)
target enforcement score 0.013 0.099 0.049 0.027 0.142 0.087
(0.161) (0.111) (0.106) (0.159) (0.098) (0.088)
R-squared 0.290 0.684 0.693 0.366 0.735 0.746
Panel C: GHG targets
GHG monitoring 0.123 0.065 0.128 0.160* 0.096 0.164* 113
(0.095) (0.106) (0.098) (0.087) (0.100) (0.092) 616
GHG target stringency -0.064 0.232*** 0.197** -0.055 0.216** 0.179**
(0.072) (0.086) (0.084) (0.071) (0.083) (0.081)
R-squared 0.295 0.669 0.680 0.369 0.714 0.729
Panel D: energy efficiency measures
measures on site score -0.013 -0.151 -0.197** 0.103 0.021 -0.019 80
(0.151) (0.100) (0.089) (0.121) (0.095) (0.083) 440
payback time  0.064 -0.052 -0.096 0.011 -0.134** -0.173***
(0.094) (0.078) (0.070) (0.068) (0.061) (0.054)
barriers to invest in energy  0.347*** 0.385*** 0.346*** 0.410*** 0.525*** 0.492***
efficiency projects (0.102) (0.091) (0.081) (0.078) (0.074) (0.067)
R-squared 0.345 0.775 0.787 0.485 0.834 0.845
3-digit sector dummies  no yes yes no yes yes
size (log employment) no no yes no no yes
energy expenditures 
over gross output 
energy expenditures 




Notes: Each column shows the results of a multivariate OLS regression of energy intensity on normalized interview scores, summary 
indices and other control variables. Each panel represents a different specification and includes all summary indices other than the index 
that includes the interview scores included already in the regression. All regressions include firm age (linear and quadratic), year 
dummies, interviewer noise controls (dummies for interviewer identity and for experience less than 10 interviews), and respondent 
characteristics (dummy for technical background, post-interview scores for knowledge about the firm and concern about climate change 
issues). Standard errors given in parenthesis are clustered at the firm level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28organziational structure which is tractable for regression analysis. Speciﬁcally, we use information
on the ofﬁcial function(s) of the manager in charge of climate change issues, henceforth referred
to as the climate change manager (CCM)22 as well as information on how far below the CEO this
person ranks in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. The role of the CCM is likely to affect management practices
and performance since different managers have different ways of dealing with climate change
issues and regulation. For example, a ﬁnancial manager is more likely to regard tradable pollution
permits as a ﬁnancial asset whereas a production manager might focus more on complying with
the cap implicit in the number of permits allocated to the ﬁrm. This is not just because these
managers have different professional backgrounds and experiences, but it also reﬂects the limits
of the competences that come with their positions. In our example, the ﬁnancial manager may lack
the authority to instruct the production manager to adjust pollution abatement in response to price
ﬂuctuations on the permit market. In turn, the production manager lacks the incentive to do so if
permit expenditures and revenues are not part of his proﬁt center. Hence, the closer a CCM is to
the CEO, the more possibilities she should have to remedy problems of overlapping competences
and ill-deﬁned incentives.
The information we use is derived from responses to the questions “Is anybody responsible for
dealing with climate change policies and energy and pollution reduction in the ﬁrm?” for which
we recorded the manager title and “How far in the hierarchy is this manager below the CEO?”
(cf. questions VI.1.a and VI.1.c in Appendix B). Out of 178 valid responses, 165 (92%) included
the title of the manager in charge. Figure 1 provides an overview of the different functions these
managers have. Roughly 75 managers are specializing in environmental issues, but most of them
also occupy other functions, such as health & safety, quality manager, etc. From the last column it
isevidentthatnotevenhalfoftheenvironmentalCCMsarededicatedexclusivelytoenvironmental
issues. The second question enables us to construct a variable measuring the distance between the
CCM and the CEO in terms of management levels. The variable takes a value of 0 if the CCM
reports directly to the CEO, a value of 1 if there is a single hierarchy level between the CCM
and the CEO, a value of 2 if two hierarchy levels separate them, and so on. The variable ranges
between 0 and 5, and its mean and standard deviation are 1.1 and 0.9, respectively. The median
and mode are equal to 1, i.e. in most ﬁrms of our sample there is a single management level
22Note that this need not be the manager we actually interviewed.


















































































































Notes: Bars represent the number of times a manager title contained the respective function. Multiple
functions were possible and frequent. The last column reports the number of times a manager was
exclusively decicated to environmental issues. Based on 178 responses.
separating the CCM from the CEO.
For further analysis we code dummy variables for the CCM title using the following four
categories: (i) environment and energy, (ii) CEO or managing director, (iii) health, safety, and
quality, and (iv) operations, production, and technical managers. Other functions are part of the
omitted category. We also code a CCM dummy that equals 1 if a ﬁrm has a dedicated CCM and 0
otherwise.
4.2 Results
Tables 11 and 12 report the results from two sets of regressions. The results in Panel A are based
on regressions of management practices on the CCM dummy and other controls. This tells us
whether having a dedicated CCM affects management practices. The results in Panel B speak
to the effect of organizational structure on management practices. The results were obtained by
regressingdifferentmanagementvariablesonthedistancetoCEOvariableandonthedummiesfor
CCM categories, conditional on the ﬁrm having a dedicated CCM. All regressions include controls
for the overall size of management, ﬁrm and respondent characteristics, and for interviewer noise.
30Table 11: Organizational structure and management practices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All firms
CCM dummy 0.163** 0.776*** 0.606** 0.435 -0.012 -0.257 -0.225 0.269
(0.078) (0.289) (0.251) (0.281) (0.235) (0.240) (0.255) (0.173)
Panel B: Firms with dedicated climate change manager
distance to CEO -0.093** 0.209** -0.021 -0.001 -0.153 -0.139 -0.179 -0.016
(0.037) (0.086) (0.096) (0.143) (0.107) (0.099) (0.115) (0.097)
CCM responsibilities
environment/energy 0.218*** 0.199 0.361* 0.408 0.101 0.461*** 0.471** 0.352**
(0.069) (0.154) (0.189) (0.254) (0.173) (0.164) (0.197) (0.170)
CEO/MD -0.269** -0.232 -0.674* -0.579 -0.995*** -0.111 -0.169 -0.299
(0.132) (0.396) (0.386) (0.553) (0.381) (0.229) (0.280) (0.317)
health/safety/quality 0.013 -0.165 0.160 -0.014 -0.254 -0.125 -0.175 -0.070
(0.067) (0.162) (0.195) (0.258) (0.193) (0.164) (0.198) (0.179)
production/technical -0.059 -0.172 -0.068 -0.213 -0.622*** 0.220 0.233 -0.145
(0.092) (0.201) (0.253) (0.369) (0.228) (0.212) (0.262) (0.223)
share of managers -0.387 0.056 -0.024 0.885 -2.099** -0.831 -1.178 1.606
(0.334) (0.759) (1.044) (1.428) (1.021) (0.861) (1.060) (0.981)
plant size 0.183 0.791*** 0.182 0.592* 0.213 0.120 0.075 0.851***
(0.112) (0.250) (0.256) (0.354) (0.290) (0.276) (0.310) (0.288)
observations 130 129 129 130 128 128 130 130























Notes: OLS regressions of the overall index of climate friendliness (column 1) or normalized interview scores (column 2-8) on the climate change manager's (CCM) 
hierarchical distance to the CEO and a set of dummy variables for the CCM's main responsibility. Explanatory variables also include firm age (linear and quadratic), sector 
dummies, a constant, interviewer noise controls (dummies for interviewer identity and for experience less than 10 interviews), and respondent characteristics (dummy for 
technical background, post-interview scores for knowledge and concern about climate change issues). Robust standard errors  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
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1Table 12: Organizational structure, climate policy and innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All firms
CCM dummy 0.145 0.582** 0.478* 0.292 0.138 0.348 0.047 -0.247
(0.230) (0.235) (0.285) (0.304) (0.263) (0.316) (0.205) (0.234)
Panel B: Firms with dedicated climate change manager
distance to CEO 0.370** -0.094 -0.100 -0.197 -0.118 -0.070 -0.191* -0.217*
(0.147) (0.100) (0.143) (0.132) (0.092) (0.126) (0.105) (0.114)
CCM responsibilities
environment/energy 0.184 0.228 0.168 0.384** 0.549*** 0.303 0.122 -0.222
(0.239) (0.195) (0.304) (0.193) (0.172) (0.207) (0.189) (0.190)
CEO/MD 0.791* -0.387 -0.391 -0.999** -0.163 -0.462 -0.680* -0.685**
(0.426) (0.321) (0.470) (0.435) (0.368) (0.332) (0.375) (0.299)
health/safety/quality -0.334 -0.268 -0.341 0.157 0.005 0.180 0.045 -0.330*
(0.250) (0.194) (0.286) (0.219) (0.181) (0.201) (0.203) (0.192)
production/technical 0.189 -0.325 -0.439 -0.110 0.351 0.271 -0.049 -0.275
(0.335) (0.257) (0.381) (0.284) (0.217) (0.248) (0.249) (0.254)
share of managers 0.764 0.510 1.240 -1.227 -1.297 1.221 -0.296 2.337**
(1.192) (1.102) (1.768) (1.311) (1.034) (1.115) (1.118) (1.021)
plant size -0.648** 0.553** 0.920** -0.433* 0.292 0.294 0.318 -0.078
(0.294) (0.247) (0.357) (0.254) (0.265) (0.264) (0.247) (0.226)
observations 107 119 119 127 115 129 127 125























Notes: OLS regressions of normalized interview scores  on the climate change manager's (CCM) hierarchical distance to the CEO and on a set of dummy variables for 
the CCM's main responsibility. Explanatory variables also include firm age (linear and quadratic), sector dummies, a constant, interviewer noise controls (dummies for 
interviewer identity and for experience less than 10 interviews), and respondent characteristics (dummy for technical background, post-interview scores for knowledge 
and concern about climate change issues). Robust standard errors  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2Panel A shows that ﬁrms with a dedicated CCM have signiﬁcantly more climate friendly man-
agement practices than those without such a manager. This result arises clearly for the overall
index of climate-friendliness as well as for several practices and policies. In particular, we ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with a CCM are more likely to participate in a CCA and to adopt energy targets. They
also do a better job at monitoring their energy usage than ﬁrms without a CCM. Conversely, there
is no signiﬁcant association of the CCM with GHG targets and GHG monitoring, with other vol-
untary schemes or with the innovation variables.
The estimates in Panel B highlight three systematic patterns of correlation which are evident in
the coefﬁcient estimates obtained for the overall index of climate friendliness in the ﬁrst column.
First, with respect to the qualitative aspect of organizational structure we ﬁnd that ﬁrms whose
CCM is an environment or energy manager have signiﬁcantly more climate-friendly practices
ceteris paribus. Second, ﬁrms whose CCM is closer in the hierarchy to the CEO are also more
climate-friendlyaccordingtoourindex. Third, theeffectofhierarchyisnon-monotonic. Whilethe
negative coefﬁcient on distance implies that climate-friendly practices improve as the CCM moves
up in the hierarchy, the negative coefﬁcient on the CEO/MD dummy implies that practices become
worse again if the CEO himself/herself assumes the responsibilities of the CCM. This could be the
case because multi-tasking leaves the CEO without a sufﬁcient amount of time to attend to climate
change issues or because these issues are one of the CEO’s ‘residual responsibilities’ not assumed
by any other manager, and hence are of low priority to the ﬁrm per se.
In order to ﬁnd out what practices are driving these results, we ran the same regression for the
individual scores underlying the index. The remaining columns in Panel B of Table 11 contain the
results for the energy and GHG target variables. Panel B of Table 12 displays the results for the
investment stringency, climate policy and innovation scores. We ﬁnd that having an environmental
or energy manager in charge of climate change issues is positively associated with the presence
of targets for both energy consumption and GHG emissions – in the latter case there is also a
positive association with the strigency of targets (cf. columns 3, 6 and 7 of Table 11). Target
enforcement is also signiﬁcantly higher in ﬁrms whose CCM is an environment/energy manager
(cf. column 8 of Table 11). Furthermore, these ﬁrms are more likely to adopt voluntary climate
policies such as the Carbon Trust energy audit and the ECA (cf. columns 4 and 5 of Table 12).
The patterns of correlation between management practices and the dummy variables for the other
33functional CCM categories are less signiﬁcant. The production/technical category of CCM enters
the regression on GHG monitoring with a negative sign (cf. column 5 of Table 11) whereas the
coefﬁcient on the Health/Safety/Quality dummy is signiﬁcant at 10% in the regression of the CCR
product innovation score, also with a negative sign (cf. column 8 of Table 12). Overall, it seems
that the qualitative effect of organizational structure is driven mainly by target setting and by
the adoption of voluntary climate policies, both of which work better in ﬁrms whose CCM is an
environmental/energy manager.
The interpretation of the coefﬁcient on the dummy for CEO/Managing Director is slightly dif-
ferent from that of the other CCM dummies in that it compounds the qualitative and the hierarchy
aspects.23 Remarkably, this dummy enters all regressions consistently in the direction of lower
climate friendliness, i.e. with a positive sign for the barriers to invest in energy efﬁciency score (in
the ﬁrst column of Table 12) and a negative sign in all other regressions. The coefﬁcient estimate
is statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions of the GHG monitoring score (column 5 of Table 11),
the Carbon Trust energy audit dummy (column 4 of Table 12) and the CCR product innovation
score (column 8 of Table 12).24
The distance to CEO variable is positively associated with the energy monitoring score (cf.
column 2 in Table 11) and with the barriers to invest in energy efﬁciency improvements (cf. col-
umn 1 of Table 12). It is negatively associated with the CCR process and product innovation
scores at 10% signiﬁcance (cf. columns 7 and 8 of Table 12). These results are consistent with the
view that the CCM’s place in the ﬁrm hierarchy determines the climate friendliness of manage-
ment practices by constraining the range of practices that can be adopted. If interpreted in a causal
fashion, our results suggest that a CCM who is at the lower end of the management hierarchy im-
proves the ﬁrm’s climate friendliness by implementing energy monitoring, i.e. at the operational
level. In contrast, being high up in the hierarchy enables the CCM to improve the ﬁrm’s climate
friendliness by stipulating more favorable investment criteria for energy efﬁciency projects or by
promoting innovation in climate-change related products, i.e. at a more strategic level.
As was the case for the overal climate friendliness index, we ﬁnd that the positive effect that
hierarchical proximity between the CCM and the CEO seems to have on climate friendliness turns
23By deﬁnition this manager’s place in the ﬁrm hierarchy cannot vary across ﬁrms.
24It is also signiﬁcant at 10% for the energy targets dummy, the barriers to energy efﬁciency investments score and
for the CCR process innovation score.
34around when the CEO herself/himself is in charge of climate change issues. Although not always
statistically signiﬁcant, we ﬁnd this non-monotonic effect of hierarchy in all regressions expect
the one for energy monitoring. This is due in part to the detrimental effects of multi-tasking but it
could also reﬂect the fact that less climate friendly ﬁrms might assign climate change issues as a
“residual” responsibility to the CEO.
5 Climate policy, management practices and innovation
The prevention of dangerous levels of global climate change requires substantial abatement of
GHG emissions to take place over the next few decades (IPPC, 2007). As far as industrial emis-
sions are concerned, moving ﬁrms to the efﬁciency frontier can provide only a limited amount of
abatement unless innovating ﬁrms keep on pushing that frontier. In fact, if current climate poli-
cies in the UK are mainly geared at fostering innovation, this could explain why we fail to ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between various policy variables and energy intensity in the
short run. Instead, one would expect to ﬁnd a positive association between policy variables and
innovation scores in the data.
This section sheds light on this issue by analyzing the link between management practices,
policy variables and the three measures of innovation discussed above (see also questions VII.1-
3 in Appendix B). As a validity check of the general R&D score, we compute the number of
patents held in the year 2005 based on data from the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) and regress
the patent count on the overall R&D score. The results from the negative binomial regressions
are displayed in Table 13. We ﬁnd a robust positive correlation between the two variables even
after conditioning on a number of control variables for sector, capital stock, ﬁrm and plant size,
as well as interviewer dummies. In view of these results we are conﬁdent that the R&D score is
informative about the ﬁrm’s innovative output.
Table 14 summarizes the patterns of correlation between the three innovation variables and
other variables in our survey. The table displays results from linear regression models where the
different dependent variables are the score for climate-change related (CCR) process innovation
(columns 1 and 2), the score for CCR product innovation (columns 3 and 4), and the score for the
importance of general R&D in the company (columns 5 and 6). Each panel reports the estimated
35Table 13: Correlation between R&D score and patent applications
(1) (2) (3)
number of patents in 2005








3-digit sector controls no yes yes
interviewer dummies no yes yes
observations 183 183 155
Notes:  Coefficients  from  negative  binomial  regression  models.  Standard  errors  in 
parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
coefﬁcient and standard error from a regression of the dependent variable on a speciﬁc index or
score from the survey data. The regression equation includes a full set of dummy variables for the
ﬁrm’s 3-digit SIC sector code to control for unobserved heterogeneity across sectors. Further, each
speciﬁcation is estimated ﬁrst without (columns 1, 3 and 5) and then with capital stock (columns
2, 4 and 6) as an additional control.
Drivers In rows 1 and 2 we ﬁnd that both types of CCR innovation are strongly correlated
with both the degree of climate change awareness and the importance of CCR products for the
ﬁrm. This reveals that managers reporting a high awareness of climate change also take real
actions of strategic importance related to climate change. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates
for general R&D suggest that the sample is well stratiﬁed, in the sense that not all R&D-intensive
ﬁrms happen to be highly aware of climate change or producers of CCR products. The lack of
a signiﬁcant correlation between the competitive pressures index and innovation (cf. row 3) is in
line with our ﬁnding that few ﬁrms expected strong effects of climate policy on competition and
relocation in the ﬁrst place.
Row 4 displays a strong positive correlation between “other drivers” and all types of R&D.
Since this index is an average of the scores for investor and customer pressure, we also report the
results from separate regressions for the two individual scores in rows 5 and 6. It seems that both
factors have an effect of equivalent size. Moreover, the relationship is stronger for CCR process
innovation than for CCR product innovation. Notice that the coefﬁcient estimates for product
36Table 14: Regressions of innovation scores on other management variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
innovation score
CCR process innovation CCR product innovation general R&D
1 awareness 0.343** 0.301** 0.497*** 0.500*** 0.220 0.250
(summary index)  (0.134) (0.139) (0.140) (0.137) (0.142) (0.150)
2        CCR products 0.422*** 0.395** 0.825*** 0.762*** 0.100 0.110
       (log score)  (0.146) (0.154) (0.160) (0.183) (0.179) (0.198)
3 competitive pressures 0.080 0.100 -0.090 -0.130 0.140 0.150
(summary index)  (0.070) (0.070) (0.152) (0.158) (0.128) (0.139)
4 other drivers 0.429*** 0.409*** 0.342** 0.300** 0.371*** 0.385***
(summary index)  (0.101) (0.110) (0.132) (0.151) (0.118) (0.133)
5        customer pressure 0.427*** 0.357** 0.343* 0.280 0.392** 0.471**
       (log score)  (0.159) (0.175) (0.185) (0.203) (0.188) (0.205)
6        investor pressure 0.464*** 0.498*** 0.408* 0.350 0.455** 0.434**
       (log score)  (0.172) (0.176) (0.212) (0.251) (0.18) (0.206)
7 energy targets 0.387*** 0.395*** 0.040 0.110 0.291** 0.300**
(summary index)  (0.102) (0.113) (0.137) (0.165) (0.119) (0.135)
8 GHG targets 0.495*** 0.439*** 0.395** 0.368* 0.443*** 0.432***
(summary index)  (0.143) (0.155) (0.178) (0.197) (0.139) (0.155)
9 CCA stringency 0.170 0.120 -0.120 -0.150 0.000 0.030
(summary index)  (0.121) (0.138) (0.138) (0.154) (0.124) (0.151)
10 EU ETS -0.04 -0.1 -0.05 -0.02 0.287* 0.423*
(summary index)  (0.18) (0.218) (0.157) (0.191) (0.170) (0.237)
11 Carbon Trust energy audit 0.130 0.060 0.080 0.050 -0.080 -0.050
(summary index)  (0.101) (0.104) (0.112) (0.117) (0.107) (0.106)
12 Enhanced Capital Allowance 0.090 0.140 0.140 0.120 0.165* 0.170
(summary index)  (0.117) (0.122) (0.158) (0.175) (0.092) (0.104)
13 barriers to energy efficiency -0.110 -0.160 0.220 0.340 -0.030 0.230
(log score)  (0.435) (0.467) (0.397) (0.470) (0.409) (0.426)
3-digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls for capital stock no yes no yes no yes
observations 181 163 176 157 183 164
 
 
Notes: Each panel represents a different regression of a CEP Climate Change Management Survey Score on another survey variable and other controls. Each cell 
reports the estimated coefficient and standard error for the variable of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. All regressions include interviewer fixed effects. Variable names of survey scores are indented whenever the score is used in the 
calculation of the summary index preceding it. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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7innovation in columns 3 and 4 of row 4 are statistically signiﬁcant whereas the corresponding
estimates in rows 5 and 6 are not signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that customer and
investor pressure are complements in a ﬁrm’s decision to undertake R&D in CCR products.
Measures Rows 7 and 8 display a strong positive correlation between CCR process innovation
with both energy quantity targets and GHG targets. This is an intriguing ﬁnding and calls for a
closer examination of the underlying mechanisms in future research. For example, it is possible
thatseniormanagementembarksonaCCRR&Dprojectandthensetstightenergyquantitytargets
to strengthen the incentives for a successful outcome of the R&D project. Conversely, it could
also be that stringent targets are implemented ﬁrst, and that their presence induces the type of
innovation that would be captured by the process innovation score. In view of our earlier ﬁnding
that targets are also associated with higher energy efﬁciency, we conjecture that only those ﬁrms
that have already picked the “low-hanging fruit” in terms of energy efﬁciency improvements need
to conduct proper R&D to further reduce energy consumption by their production processes.
It is striking that CCR product innovation is positively correlated with GHG quantity targets
but not signiﬁcantly so with energy quantity targets. A straightforward explanation for the lack of
correlation is that CCR product innovation reduces energy consumption of the ﬁrms’ customers
but does not necessarily help the ﬁrm itself to meet its energy quantity targets. In contrast, for
a ﬁrm that tries to sell a CCR product it may be important to be perceived by their customers as
“climate-friendly”, and hence the presence of GHG targets and emissions monitoring is a vital
part of their marketing strategy. Notice that, according to this idea, the directions of causation
for process and product innovation are diametrically opposed in that stringent energy and GHG
targets both cause process innovation, yet product innovation causes GHG targets.
In contrast to the strong positive association found above between the energy intensity of the
ﬁrm and the score measuring barriers to invest in energy efﬁciency projects, the results in the last
row of Table 14 show no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between this score and any of the
innovation scores. Hence, simple payback criteria may guide decisions on the adoption of existing
technologies but they are inconsequential for the invention and commercialization of new products
or processes. This is plausible because R&D spending is a long-term – often strategic – investment
with uncertain returns for which simple rules-of-thumb hardly seem appropriate.
38Policies There is no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the CCA index and any of the
innovation variables (cf. Panel 9). This contrasts with the ﬁnding by Martin and Wagner (2009)
that ﬁrms in a CCA ﬁled signiﬁcantly fewer patent applications than ﬁrms paying the full rate
of the CCL after 2001. Controlling for unobserved effects that systematically vary with CCA
participation status proved to be important in their study. Since our dataset is cross sectional we
have less scope to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In Table 15 we seek to address this issue
to some extent by adding more covariates, and by looking at the difference between the CCR
innovation score and the general R&D score which controls for unobserved ﬁrm characteristics
affecting both types of innovation. Panel 1 of Table 15 displays the results from regressions that
control for size (capital stock, number of employees at the plant and in the ﬁrm) and for innovative
capacity of the ﬁrm (number of patents in 2000). In columns 1 and 2 we look at general R&D,
in columns 3 to 6 at CCR process and in columns 7 to 10 at CCR product R&D. The results on
general and process R&D remain insigniﬁcant. For CCR product innovation we ﬁnd negative
coefﬁcients which are signiﬁcant at the 10% level, once we include more covariates. The results
thus provide weak support for the hypothesis that the signiﬁcant innovation effects found in Martin
and Wagner (2009) are due to ﬁrms engaging in more CCR product R&D.
Participation in the EU ETS, analyzed in row 10 of Table 14, has no signiﬁcant effect on CCR
process or product innovation. The lack of an innovation impact of this EU wide policy can in
part be explained by the low quota prices that have prevailed on the carbon markets so far, and in
part by the high volatility of permit prices during phase I of the trading scheme (2005-2007). As
is the case with other real options, uncertainty about future prices might induce ﬁrms to postpone
irreversible investments in R&D. Similarly, ﬁrms may have been waiting for legal certainty about
future tightening of ETS targets beyond the end of phase II in 2012 before spending resources on
CCR R&D.
We do ﬁnd a positive association between ETS membership and general R&D which is signif-
icant at the 10% level. However, additional results reported in Panel 2 of Table 15 show that this
relationship is not robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables such as the number of
patents held in 2000 as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock. In contrast, a signiﬁcant negative
relationship emerges for CCR process R&D relative to overall R&D, implying that ﬁrms in the
EU ETS substitute away from CCR process innovation towards other areas of innovation.
39Table 15: Regressions of innovation scores on policy indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
dependent variables general R&D CCR process R&D CCR product R&D
level relative to R&D level relative to R&D
CCA 0.001 -0.020 0.173 -0.073 0.175 -0.066 -0.124 -0.433* -0.109 -0.393*
(summary index) (0.124) (0.220) (0.121) (0.194) (0.151) (0.254) (0.138) (0.223) (0.140) (0.210)
capital  -0.047 0.135 0.197 0.131 0.174*
(0.105) (0.119) (0.138) (0.110) (0.100)
patents held in 2000  0.023 -0.003 -0.025 0.048*** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
plant size  -0.066 0.105 0.177 0.193 0.276
(0.268) (0.324) (0.300) (0.351) (0.266)
firm size  0.194 0.110 -0.048 0.049 -0.195
(0.165) (0.181) (0.203) (0.203) (0.182)
EU ETS  0.287* 0.307 -0.043 -0.147 -0.335* -0.454** -0.050 -0.008 -0.327* -0.311
(summary index) (0.170) (0.311) (0.180) (0.345) (0.178) (0.210) (0.157) (0.286) (0.174) (0.363)
capital  -0.021 0.163 0.184 0.123 0.148
(0.128) (0.114) (0.155) (0.111) (0.123)
patents held  in 2000  0.039*** -0.002 -0.041*** 0.054*** 0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
plant size  -0.036 0.154 0.190 0.131 0.178
(0.256) (0.302) (0.268) (0.327) (0.261)
firm size  0.091 0.129 0.038 -0.095 -0.195
(0.217) (0.231) (0.270) (0.208) (0.207)
Carbon Trust energy audit 0.097 0.211 0.201 0.108 0.138 -0.051 0.209 -0.004 0.111 -0.270
(0.202) (0.238) (0.200) (0.297) (0.247) (0.321) (0.228) (0.290) (0.247) (0.252)
capital  -0.046 0.185* 0.238 0.149 0.193
(0.112) (0.104) (0.142) (0.099) (0.118)
patents held in 2000 0.024* -0.005 -0.029* 0.044*** 0.019
(0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
plant size -0.086 0.033 0.118 -0.018 0.086
(0.256) (0.287) (0.279) (0.304) (0.263)
firm size 0.191 0.118 -0.029 -0.024 -0.238
(0.180) (0.184) (0.213) (0.207) (0.182)
observations 166 120 164 120 163 119 160 117 159 116
Notes: All regressions include 3-digit sector dummies and interviewer dummies. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses (i.e. 
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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0Row 11 of Table 14 shows that participation in an energy audit by the Carbon Trust is not
associated with a signiﬁcant change in any kind of innovative activity. This is consistent with the
purpose of these audits, namely to identify opportunities for known types of energy efﬁciency im-
provements that come at close to zero cost. A robustness analysis in Panel 3 of Table 15 conﬁrms
this result, showing no signiﬁcant impact of the audits on any of the innovation scores. The point
estimates in row 12 suggest that beneﬁciaries of the Enhanced Capital Allowance innovate more,
but none of them is statistically signiﬁcant a the 5% level. This ﬁnding is not surprising as the
allowance was granted for the adoption of existing technologies and not for R&D expenditures
with uncertain outcomes. It is possible that the allowance freed up ﬁnancial resources that ﬁrms
subsequently deployed to R&D projects, yet this effect is not estimated precisely.
To sum up, this section has presented evidence that a number of climate friendly management
practices are positively associated with climate friendly innovation. An important policy implica-
tion of this result is that some of the managerial factors that facilitate energy efﬁciency investments
could also promote clean innovation, thus leveraging their beneﬁcial effect. The empirical link be-
tween existing climate policies and innovation is weaker, which suggests that the design of these
policies could be improved to align them with long-term mitigation objectives.
6 Conclusion
There is little doubt that policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions from the business sector must
strengthen the incentives for improving energy efﬁciency. Firms can improve energy efﬁciency
by adopting existing technologies or by inventing new technologies that are more energy efﬁcient.
The aim of this paper has been to shed new light on how a ﬁrm’s management practices interact
with both these channels, and to pin down speciﬁc organizational and managerial constraints that
add to the technical difﬁculties associated with improving energy efﬁciency.
We have collected original data on management practices related to climate change by adapt-
ing an interview approach from the recent productivity literature for our purposes. The deﬁning
characteristics of this design are (i) to conduct “double-blind” telephone interviews with plant
managers in a way that minimizes well-known types of survey bias, (ii) to consistently measure
and compare climate-change related practices across ﬁrms controlling for systematic noise in the
41responses and (iii) to seek external validation of interview responses by matching them with inde-
pendent data on business performance, including energy efﬁciency.
Our sample exhibits considerable variation in management practices, organizational structure,
exposure to different government policies and other ﬁrm characteristics. Consistent with the “en-
ergy efﬁciency paradox”, managers report what appear to be irrationally low payback times and
that signiﬁcant amounts of GHG emissions could be saved at zero incremental cost. We construct
a summary index of all “climate friendly” management practices at the ﬁrm and show that it is
positively associated with its energy efﬁciency and TFP. Analysis of individual practices reveals
that the presence of targets on energy consumption is associated with higher levels of energy ef-
ﬁciency and TFP, while applying more stringent investment criteria for energy efﬁciency projects
than for other investments is associated with lower levels of both measures. What is more, ﬁrms
are less energy-intensive on average when they are pressed by their customers to reduce their GHG
emissions. This is even more so when the ﬁrm’s investors exert this pressure.
A number of managerial factors – including the management’s awareness of climate change is-
sues, targets for energy consumption or for GHG emissions as well as pressure from customers or
from investors to adopt more climate friendly management practices – are also positively cor-
related with climate-change related process or product innovation. The relationship between
climate-change related innovation and various existing climate policy measures is less clear. We
ﬁnd that process innovation relative to overall R&D efforts is lower at ﬁrms in the EU ETS while
product innovation relative to overall R&D efforts is lower at ﬁrms that pay lower energy taxes by
virtue of being in a UK CCA.
We also investigate how management practices correlate with the organizational structure of
the ﬁrm. Organizational structure is characterized by the ofﬁcial title of the manager responsible
for climate change issues and his or her hierarchical proximity to the CEO. We show that orga-
nizational structure explains a large part of the variation in management practices across ﬁrms.
In particular, ﬁrms have more climate friendly management practices ceteris paribus if climate
change issues are managed by the environmental or energy manager. This concerns the adop-
tion of targets for both energy consumption and GHG emissions as well as the participation in
voluntary policies aimed at improving energy efﬁciency. Moreover, hierarchical proximity of the
climate change manager to the CEO is associated with ﬁrms adopting more strategic practices,
42such as product and process innovation related to climate change, as opposed to operational prac-
tices such as energy monitoring. Importantly, this effect is non-monotonic, in the sense that ﬁrms
whose climate change manager is the managing director or CEO exhibit worse management prac-
tices ceteris paribus.
In summary, we have provided – through the collection of original data and subsequent match-
ing to ofﬁcial performance data – new evidence on the empirical link between the organizational
structure of a ﬁrm and the management practices it adopts on the one hand and its energy efﬁ-
ciency and responsiveness to climate change policies on the other hand. Management practices
explain a great deal of the dispersion in energy intensity across ﬁrms within a sector, even after
controlling for size, age, and other exogenous ﬁrm characteristics. This supports the view that
the “energy efﬁciency paradox” – the observation that ﬁrms fail to adopt energy saving measures
despite positive net returns – can be explained by managerial and organizational factors internal
to the ﬁrm. Perhaps more important from a climate policy perspective, however, is our ﬁnding
that several such factors are also associated with the ﬁrm’s innovation of cleaner processes and
products. While causal inference is beyond the scope of this study, we cautiously interpret our
ﬁndings as evidence that management practices and organizational structure of a ﬁrm are crucial
for its ability to use energy more efﬁciently both today and in the future, and to respond to public
policy in this area.
Future research on this topic is likely to take three directions. First, the focus on a single coun-
try limits the variation in policy variables one can hope for. The limiting factor in expanding this
work to other countries (besides researchers’ resource constraints) must be seen in the availability
of independent performance data, particularly on energy usage. Second, the empirical results of
this paper will hopefully inspire research on more accurate models of energy use at the ﬁrm level
that have testable implications. Finally, future research may be able to exploit exogenous variation
that allows for causal inference in testing such models.
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45Appendices
A Additional information on manager interviews
A.1 Interview process
We conducted structured telephone interviews with managers at randomly selected UK produc-
tion facilities belonging to the manufacturing sector. The interview setup bears close resemblance
to the innovative management interview design developed by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) in
collaboration with a major management consulting company. The deﬁning characteristics of this
design are (i) to conduct “double-blind” telephone interviews with plant managers in a way that
minimizes well-known types of survey bias, (ii) to consistently measure and compare climate-
change related practices across ﬁrms controlling for systematic noise in the responses and (iii) to
seek external validation of interview responses by matching them with independent data on busi-
ness performance. In what follows, we provide additional information on the interview process
which complements Section 2 of the paper.
Sampling frame
Interviewees were selected from a random sample of UK ﬁrms. In order to assure that the inter-
viewers do not know anything about the company a priori, we focus on medium sized companies
that are not household names. To this end, we used Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS database (see
http://www.bvdep.com) to download contact details for all UK ﬁrms that had more than 250 but
less than 5000 employees in 2007. Next, the resulting list of more than 4000 companies was
put in random order and split into batches of 100 ﬁrms. Each interviewer was given a batch and
instructed to work down the list, one entry after another, without skipping.
Scheduling
Interviewers made “cold calls” to production facilities (not head ofﬁces), gave their name and
afﬁliation and then asked to be put through to the plant manager. If a plant manager was not
existent or not available, interviewers asked, successively, to speak to the production manager,
46chief operating ofﬁcer, chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, or environmental manager. At this stage, the terms
“survey” or even “research” were avoided as both are associated with commercial market research
and some switchboard operators have instructions to reject such calls. Instead, interviewers said
that they were involved with doing “a piece of work” on climate change policies, innovation and
competitiveness in the business sector and would like to have a chat with someone in the ﬁeld.
Once the manager was on the phone, the interviewer asked whether he or she would be willing
to have a conversation of about 45 minutes about these issues. Depending on the manager’s
willingness and availability to do so, an interview ensued or was scheduled for another time. If the
manager refused, he or she was asked to provide the interviewer with another contact at the ﬁrm
who might be willing to comment. Managers who agreed to give an interview were sent a letter to
conﬁrm the date and time of the interview. The letter also contained background information on
the researchers names and institutions and assured the managers that their responses were going
to be treated as conﬁdential. A similar letter was sent to managers who requested additional
information before scheduling an interview.
Data collection
Interviewers were working on computers with an internet connection and accessed the central
interview data base via a custom-built web interface that we programmed. The web interface
includes a scheduling tool and an interview screen with hyperlinks to a manual that provides
the analysts with background information on each question. For all interviews, the scheduling
history as well as the exact time and date, duration, identity of interviewers and listeners etc. were
recorded.
Approximately twenty pilot interviews were conducted between October and December of
2008 and led to several improvements of the interview structure. From January until mid March
of 2009, an additional 190 interviews were conducted based on the ﬁnal set of questions listed in
Appendix B below.
A.2 Mitigating potential interviewer bias
Our approach differs from typical survey formats in that the task of scoring responses is relegated
to the interviewers. This procedure is chosen in order to reduce known types of survey bias on
47Figure 2: Double Scoring
  Notes: The ﬁgure plots the average score given by the interviewer against the average score given by another analyst
listening to the interview, using data from 65 interviews that were ‘double scored’ in this way. The average score is
computed as the unweighted mean of the raw scores for all 21 ordinally scored questions. Fitted values are obtained
from an OLS regression of the interviewer average score on listener average score.
the part of the respondents. However, one might worry that the interviewers’ preconceptions
about the ﬁrms they interview might inﬂuence the score, especially in the case of brand-name
products and/or large multinational ﬁrms. We seek to minimize such bias by focusing on mid-
size ﬁrms which are less likely to ﬁt this category. Moreover, in the regression analysis we use
interviewer ﬁxed effects to control for interviewer-speciﬁc noise inducing serial correlation in the
scores. Further controls are included for the interviewer’s experience and for the respondent’s
characteristics such as educational background, overall knowledge about the issues discussed and
attitude towards climate change.
Inordertoverifythattheresponsescoreisnotjustpurenoisebutcarriesadiscerniblesignalwe
conducted several interviews for which an additional team member listened in and independently
scored the answers. For each of the 21 questions that were scored in an ordinal fashion Table 16
reports the correlation coefﬁcients between the two scores recorded (in column 1) as well as the
relative frequency of identical scores (in column 2) or almost identical scores (in column 3), where
the latter allows for a tolerance of 1. The correlation coefﬁcients range between 0.61 and 0.94,
and the proportion of equal scores is well above 50% in the majority of cases. Figure 2 summarizes
this information by plotting the average score given by the person running the interview against
the average score given by another person listening to the interview. The plot is based on the 65
ﬁrms whose interviews were ‘double-scored’ in this way and shows a strong positive relationship
with an almost 45-degree regression line. A Spearman test for rank correlation gives a correlation
48Table 16: Correlation between interviewer and analyst scores for ‘double scored’ interviews
(1) (2) (3)
correlation
adaptation to climate change score 0.78 80.0% 89.2%
awareness of climate change score 0.80 52.3% 92.3%
barriers to investments in energy efficiency score 0.71 75.4% 86.2%
CCA stringency 0.63 66.2% 83.1%
climate-change related products score 0.70 60.0% 86.2%
competitive pressure due to climate change score 0.79 64.6% 90.8%
competitive relocation due to climate change score 0.82 83.1% 93.8%
customer pressure score 0.81 56.9% 90.8%
energy consumption targets score 0.82 53.8% 89.2%
energy monitoring score 0.71 44.6% 84.6%
target enforcement score 0.84 53.8% 87.7%
rationality of behaviour on ETS market score 0.77 90.8% 95.4%
stringency of ETS target score 0.94 92.3% 96.9%
GHG monitoring score 0.85 70.8% 83.1%
GHG emissions targets score 0.89 64.6% 72.3%
investor pressure score 0.75 50.8% 76.9%
process innovation score 0.67 53.8% 86.2%
product innovation score 0.71 61.5% 84.6%
purchasing choices score 0.82 61.5% 92.3%
Research and Development - broad innovation score 0.74 53.8% 92.3%






Notes: The table compares the numerical scores given by the interviewer to those given by an analyst who listened to the 
interview for each of the questions graded on a scale from 1 to 5. Column 1 reports the correlation coefficient. Column 2 
reports the relative frequency of the event that both analysts gave the same score and column 3 the relative frequency of the 
score difference being at most 1. 
coefﬁcient of 0.746 and the hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance
level. We thus conclude that the scores are a noisy but informative measure of the interviewee’s
responses.
49A.3 Distribution of the z-scores







































































































































































































































50Questions Values Coding description
I. Climate Change Awareness




Mentioned positive impact  yes, no
2. Climate-change related products 
Low No CC related products 
Mid
High
II.  Compulsory policies 
1. ETS








(a) Are  climate  change  topics  being  discussed  within  your 
business? Can you give examples?
(b) Are climate change related issues formally discussed in 
management meetings? Can you give an example?
(c) Do your strategic objectives mention climate change?
(d) Did you commission reports or studies on how climate 
change will affect your business? 
1-5, dk, rf
Don't  know  if  threat  or  opportunity.  No 
awareness 
Some awareness backed up by evidence that this 
is being formally discussed by management 
Evidence  that  CC  is  an  important  part  of  the 
business strategy. 
(a)  Do  you  currently  sell  climate-change  related  products? 
(Products that help your customers to reduce GHG emissions 
or adapt to climate change)
(b) Can you give examples?
(c) How important is that as a source of revenue within your 
firm? 
1-5, dk, rf
Some CC related products. These products are 
however not the main profit or revenue source of 
the firm 
The  majority  of  the  firm's  output  can  be 
considered a climate-change related product
1. Stringency
(a) Is your company (or parts thereof) regulated through the 
European Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions trading system? 
(b) Since when? 
no, 2005-2009, yes dk 
year, dk, rf
2. (a) How stringent is the emissions cap/quota imposed by 
the ETS? 
(b) Can you describe some of the measures you had to put in 
place to comply with the cap? 
1-5, dk, rf, na
Some  adjustment  seem  to  have  taken  place, 
however  nothing  which  led  to  fundamental 
changes in practices; e.g. light bulbs, insulation 
etc. 
Measures which led to fundamental changes in 
production  processes;  e.g.  fuel  switching; 
replacement of essential plant and machinery 
3. By how much does the ETS cap/quota require you to reduce 
your emissions by 2012 (relative to when you joined ETS)? 
no because of image 
concern, no because no 
capacity, no other, bought, 
sold, both, dk, rf
5. Rationality of market behaviour
(a) How do you decide how many permits to buy or sell or 
trade at all? 
(b) Did you base this decision on any forecast about prices 
and/or energy usage? 
(c)  Did  you  trade  permit  revenue  off  against  emission 
reduction costs in your planning on this issue?
1-5, dk, rf, na
Take their permit allocation as a target to be met 
as such and do not take into account the price of 
permits or the cost of abatement, and just buy or 
sell  whatever  the  excedent  is.  Permit  trading 
decision is centralised. 
Are in the process of learning how the market 
works  and  in  the  first  years  did  not  take  any 
market driven attitude but now have someone in 
charge of managing the ETS so as to minimize 
compliance cost. This person has experience in 
financial markets and sometimes interacts with 
the production manager. 
Company has a thorough understanding of the 
abatement cost curve. Trading is used as a tool 
to reduce compliance cost and to generate extra 
revenue  from  excess  abatement.  Moreover, 
company forms expectations about permit price 
and re-optimizes abatement choice if necessary.2. Participating in CCA
Low  Target corresponds to business as usual 
Mid 
High 
3. Did you buy or sell emission rights via the UK ETS? 
III. Drivers - Competitive Pressures 




2. Relocation because of climate change policies 
Low  No plans for relocation 
Mid 
High  Complete relocation of the site imminent 
text box
IV. Drivers - Other 
1. Customer pressure concerning climate change 
Low  Nothing required 
Mid 
High 
2. Investor pressure concerning climate change 
Low  Nothing required 
Mid 
High 
1.  (a)  Is  your  company  (or  parts  thereof)  subject  to  a  UK 
Climate Change Agreement? 
(b) Since when? 
No, 2000-2009, yes dk 
year, dk, rf, na
2. (a) How stringent is the target imposed by the CCA? 
(b) Can you describe some of the measures you had to put in 
place to comply with the cap? 
1-5, dk, rf, na
Some  adjustment  seem  to  have  taken  place; 
however  nothing  which  led  to  fundamental 
changes in practices; e.g. light bulbs, insulation 
etc. 
Measures which led to fundamental changes in 
production  processes;  e.g.  fuel  switching; 
replacement of essential plant and machinery.
no because of image 
concern, no because no 
capacity, no other, bought, 
sold, both, dk, rf, na
4. By how much does the CCA target require you to reduce 
your  energy  consumption  or  carbon  emissions  by  2010 
(relative to when you joined the CCA)? 
percent, target (relative, 
absolute), type (energy 
target, carbon target, dk)
(a) Are you more or less affected than your competitors from 
climate  change  policies?  (domestic,  international  or  both, 
depends on where the competitors are) 
(b) Can you give an example? Can you explain why? 
1-5, dk, rf
Negative  effects;  i.e.  competitors  face 
significantly  less  regulation  or  are  in  a  better 
position  to  adjust  to  the  same  regulation; 
examples: major competitors are abroad where 
no  regulation  applies;  competitor  can  more 
cheaply switch to less polluting technology 
All  competitors  face  same  regulation  (or,  the 
firm has no competitors) 
Positive  effects;  e.g.  competitors  face  stronger 
regulation; competitors have more difficulty in 
adjusting to the same level of regulation
1.  (a)  Are  you  considering  relocating  or  outsourcing 
production  abroad  in  response  to  climate  change  policies? 
(current or expected) 
(b) How concrete are these plans? 
(c) How many jobs will this affect? 
1-5, dk, rf
Some  plans  to  relocate  parts  of  production 
abroad.  Evidence  that  plans  are  concrete;  e.g. 
detailed knowledge of which parts and to where 
2. Mentioned relocation for other reasons (if did not mention 
anything, leave blank) 
(a)  Are  your  customers  concerned  about  your  GHG 
emissions? 
(b) How do they voice this concern? 
(c)  Do  your  customers  require  hard  data  on  your  carbon 
emissions? 
1-5, dk, rf
Customers  ask  for  some  improvements  on 
energy  efficiency  and  look  for  a  "climate 
friendly"  product,  but  they  do  not  expect  or 
require data as proof. Labelling the product as 
"green"  is  enough  to  satisfy  customers 
preferences 
Customers consistently ask for certified data on 
emissions  during  production  or  usage.  A 
customer friendly system to recognize the best 
products  in  term  of  energy  efficiency  is  often 
available  in  the  market  (e.g.  EU  energy 
efficiency grade for home appliances ) 
(a) Are your investors concerned about your GHG emissions? 
(b) How do they voice this concern? 
(c)  Did  your  investors  require  hard  data  on  your  carbon 
emissions? 
(d) Did they impose  targets or  specific  measures to reduce 
GHG emissions? 
1-5, dk, rf
Investors raise the issue of climate change and 
demand reporting on pollution. Some evidence 
would  be  good;  e.g.  issue  was  raised  at  last 
Annual General Assembly 
Investors  demand  concrete  measures  to  reduce 
pollution V. Measures 




2. GHG monitoring 
Low  No specific 
Mid 
High 
3. Existence and stringency of targets on energy consumption for management 
Type of target
Low  No targets 
Mid  Targets exist but seem easy to achieve 
High 
percent 
3. Since when are you having these targets? 
4. Stringency of targets on GHG emissions for management 
Type of target
Low  No targets 
Mid  Targets exist but seem easy to achieve 
High 
percent
3. Since when are you having these targets? 








(a) How detailed do you monitor your energy usage? 
(b) How often do you monitor your energy usage? 
(c ) Describe the system you have in place. 
1-5, dk, rf
No monitoring apart from looking at the energy 
bill 
Energy monitoring as opposed to looking at the 
energy bill 
Detailed energy monitoring in space and time; 
e.g. hourly monitoring of power or gas used by 
production line 
(a) Do you explicitly monitor your GHG emissions? 
(b)  Do  you account  for GHG  emissions embedded in  your 
supply chain? How? 
(c) Are you GHG figures externally validated?"  1-5, dk, rf
Detailed energy monitoring with clear evidence 
for carbon accounting (at firm level) 
Carbon  accounting  of  both  direct  and  indirect 
emissions  (supply  chain  emissions);  External 
validation of GHG figures 
1. (a) Do you have any targets on energy consumption which 
management has to observe? (e.g. kWh of electricity) 
(b)  Can  you  describe  some  of  the  challenges  you  face  in 
meeting the targets? 
(c) Do you think these are stringent targets? How likely is it 
that you meet those targets? 
no target, relative and/or 
absolute quantity target, 
only expenditure target, 
dk, rf 
1-5, dk, rf Evidence  that  targets  are  hard  to  achieve. 
Detailed  description  of  serious  problems  in 
achieving targets 
2. Approximately  by  how  much  does  this  require  reducing 
your current energy consumption in the next 5 years (10%, 
25%, 50%)? 
2000 (or earlier), 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
1. (a) Do you have any targets on greenhouse gas emissions in 
addition or instead of targets on energy? (e.g. on tonnes of 
CO2 emitted) 
(b)  Can  you  describe  some  of  the  challenges  you  face  in 
meeting the targets? 
(c) Do you think these are stringent targets? How likely is it 
that you meet those targets? 
no target, direct emissions, 
direct and indirect 
emissions, dk, rf
1-5, dk, rf Evidence  that  targets  are  hard  to  achieve. 
Detailed  description  of  serious  problems  in 
achieving targets 
2. Approximately  by  how  much  does  this  require  reducing 
your current emissions in the next 5 years (10%, 25%, 50%)? 
2000 (or earlier), 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
(a) What happens if targets are not met? 
(b) Do you publicize targets and target achievement within the 
firm or to the public? Can you give examples? 
(c)  Are  there  financial  consequences  in  case  of  non-
achievement? 
(d) Is there a bonus for target achievement? 
1-5, dk, rf, na
No  targets  or  missing  targets  does  not  trigger 
any response 
Both, target achievement and non achievement 
are internally and externally communicated 
Target  non-achievement  leads  to  financial 
consequences  internally  and/or  externally; 
including penalties, e.g. staff do not get bonus; 
carbon credits have to be bought 
(a) Did you take any concrete measures to reduce greenhouse 
emissions? 
(b) Can you give specific examples? 
1-5, dk, rf
No measures taken to reduce direct or indirect 
emissions 
Company  makes  some  effort  to  reduce  direct 
emissions (GHG) and indirect emissions trying 
to reduce energy consumption on site or using 
electricity  produced  by  renewable  source  of 
energy 
Company  adopts  best  available  practices  to 
reduce emissions. It uses electricity produced by 
renewable  sources  of  energy  or  produce 
electricity  on  site  (e.g.  geothermal  energy).  It 
reuses  excess  energy  from  the  production 
process  for  co-generation  of  heat  (e.g.  to  heat 
indoor  spaces,  to  sell  it  to  surrounding 
companies/households or to produce electricity 
to be fed back into the grid)7. A recent emission reducing measure 
2. Describe what it was all about?  text box
percent
percent
If other, please explain  text box
6. What motivated the adoption of this measure? 
If other, please explain  text box
8. Barriers to adopting energy-efficiency investments 
text box









5 >15  years
Low  Much less stringent 
Mid  Equal 
High  Much more stringent 
4. If different: Why?  text box
5. What other factors were influential in the decision?  text box
9. Further reductions 
percent
percent
10. Participation in voluntary government climate change policies 
Policy measures Participated  Appreciation 
3. Innovation grants from the Carbon Trust? When? 
4. Carbon Trust Standard 
5. Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme? (ECA) 
6. Anything else? (other)  text box
1. Did you recently implement an emission reducing measure? 
When? If there were several, can we discuss the one that had 
the biggest impact on emissions? 
2000 (or earlier), 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
3.  How  much  did  this  single  measure  reduce  your  (total) 
energy consumption? 
4. How much did this single measure reduce your (total) GHG 
emissions? 
5. How did you learn about this measure?     consultant, government, 
customer, 
supplier, employee, R&D 
project, 
competitor, other, dk, 
rf, na 
EU ETS, energy cost 








compliance with expected 
future regulation, other, 
dk, rf, na 
1.  Can  you  give  examples  of  measures  to  enhance  energy 
efficiency which were considered but eventually not adopted? 
(take note here whether talks about  lighting, space heating, 
AC, stand-by consumption etc.) 
2. To the extent that this decision was based on the expected 
economic  return  of  such  measures,  can  you  tell  me  what 




3. Is this  [hurdle rate/payback time] criterion more, less or 
equally stringent than the one applied to non-energy related 
measures to cut costs? 
1-5, dk, rf, na
(a) By how much could you - at current energy prices - further 
reduce  your  current  GHG  emissions  without  compromising 
your economic performance? 
(i.e. how much more emission reduction could be achieved 
without increasing costs) 
(b)  What  further  GHG  emission  reduction  would  be 
technologically possible (although not necessarily at no extra 
cost)? 
Notes: Assuming that production stays constant. This should 
not  include  emission  reduction  achieved  by  switching  to 
renewable  electricity.  Include  emissions  reductions  through 
CHP however.
(a) Are you aware of voluntary government schemes to help 
businesses reduce GHG pollution? 
(b) Which ones? 
(c) Are you participating in any? 
1. Carbon Trust Online Tools (Benchmarking Tools, Action 
Plan Tool)? When? 
no, 2001-2009, yes dk 
year, dk, rf, na dk, useful, not useful
2. Carbon Trust Energy Audit or Advice? (CTaudit) VI. Measures - Management 
1. Current Responsibility for Climate Change issues 
Manger title if mentioned  text box
(b) What other responsibilities does this manager have? 
If other, please explain   text box
2. Past Responsibility for Climate Change issues 
Manger title if mentioned  text box
(c) What other responsibilities did this manager have? 
If other, please explain   text box
VII. Measures - Innovation 
1. Importance of Research & Development in the firm 
Low  No R&D activity at the firm 
Mid 
High  Highly R&D intensive firm
(g) Is this R&D activity taking place at the current site? 
2. Climate-change related process innovation (helping to reduce company GHG emissions) 
Low 
Mid  Evidence of R&D projects to reduce emissions 
High 
(e) Is this R&D activity taking place at the current site? 
text box




(d) Is this R&D activity taking place at the current site? 
text box
(a) Is  anybody responsible  for dealing with climate  change 
policies and energy and pollution reduction in the firm? (if 
several take highest ranking manager) 
yes, no, dk, rf
no other roles, production, 
health/safety/environment, 
accounting/finance, other
(c) How far in the hierarchy is this manager below the CEO? 
(figure out through sequential questioning if necessary) 
CEO, 0-10, dk, rf, no clear 
responsibilities
(a) Has there recently been  a change  in responsibilities for 
climate change issues? When? 
no change, 2000-2010, yes 
dk year, dk, rf
(b)  Who  -  if  anybody  -  was  responsible  for  dealing  with 
climate change policies and energy and pollution reduction in 
the firm before that change? 
yes, no, dk, rf
no other roles, production, 
health/safety/environment, 
accounting/finance, other
(d) How far in the hierarchy is this manager below the CEO? 
(figure out through sequential questioning if necessary) 
CEO, 0-10, dk, rf, no clear 
responsibilities
(a) Is there much Research & Development activity carried 
out within your firm? (either in-house or by commissioning 
external partners or overseas branches) 
(b) Do you devote some staff time or other resources to create 
new ideas, extra knowledge? Do you try to improve both what 
you produce and how you produce it? 
(c) Do you have a dedicated R&D department? 
(d) Can you give examples of some recent projects? 
(e) What fraction of revenues are used for that? (more than 1% 
would be a big) 
(f) What fraction of your products are new (less than 5 years 
old)? 
1-5, dk, rf
Some  activity,  for  example  does  not  have  a 
properly  speaking  R&D  department,  but  staff 
new ideas are evaluated (internal competition). 
New  ideas  are  followed-up  and  management 
discuss them 
yes, no, dk, rf
(h) If this R&D activity is mainly taking place at another site, 
in which country is this site located? 
list of countries, dk, rf
(a) Are some of these resources (R&D department, staff time, 
other  projects)  used  to  develop/implement  new  ways  of 
reducing  the  GHG  emissions  related  to  the  production 
process? 
(b) Can you give examples? 
(c) What fraction of your Research & Development funds are 
used for that? (less than 10%, more than 10%?) 
(d) Are you having other "green" R&D projects? 
1-5, dk, rf
No  R&D  funds  committed  to  reducing  GHG 
emissions 
Evidence that this kind of R&D is an important 
component in the company's R&D portfolio (if 
they  can  provide  a  figure  on  the  share  it's 
probably a 5) 
yes, no, dk, rf
(f) If this R&D activity is mainly taking place at another site, 
in which country is this site located? 
list of countries, dk, rf
(g)  Mentioned  other  (non  GHG  related)  environmental 
process innovation projects 
(a) Are  you trying to develop new products  that help  your 
customers reducing GHG emissions? 
(b) Can you give examples? 
(c) What fraction of your Research & Development funds are 
used for that? (less than 10%, more than 10%?)  1-5, dk, rf
No  R&D  funds  committed  to  reducing  GHG 
emissions 
GHG  emission  reductions  are  a  secondary 
objective for at least some R&D projects 
The company has major R&D projects that try to 
find  low-carbon  production  processes  or  new 
products  related  to  climate  change;  e.g.  clean 
tech products such as solar panels; fuel cells etc.
yes, no, dk, rf
(e) If this R&D activity is mainly taking place at another site, 
in which country is this site located? 
list of countries, dk, rf
(f) Mentioned other (non GHG related) environmental product 
innovation projects VIII. Other Measures 




2. Voluntary offsetting 
percent
3. Adaptation 
Low  No adaptation measures in place 
Mid 
High 
IX. Firm and Plant Characteristics 
1. How many people are employed in the firm (globally)?  #
2. How many people does the firm employ in the UK?  #
3. How many people are employed at current site?  #
4. What percentage of site employees are union members?  percent
5. Has ownership changed in the last 2 years? 
7. How many sites does the firm operate (globally)?  #
8. How many sites does the firm operate in the UK?  #
9. When did operations in the current country start?  year
10. What fraction of your running costs are for energy?  percent
percent 
# 000 (thousands of local currency) 




Direct emissions (d)  #
Indirect (embedded in intermediates)  #
Executive Travel (x)  #
Distribution (b)  #
#
15. Does your company purchase renewable power? 
What fraction of total consumption?  percent 
16. Site has environmental management system (ISO14000) 
17. Number of competitors globally (including UK)?  #
18. Number of competitors in current country?  #
19. Share of site output for export  percent 
20. Share of site inputs imported  percent 
21. What percentage of site employees are managers?  percent 
percent 
(a) Do GHG emissions matter for purchasing and investment 
decisions? How? 
(b)  Do  you  routinely  gather  data  about  GHG  emissions 
implied by different purchase and investment options? 
(c) Was there an example in the past where you choose one 
option  over  another  on  the  grounds  that  it  had  less  GHG 
impacts? 
1-5, dk, rf
No information about energy efficiency or GHG 
emission  impact  available  when  making 
purchasing and investment decisions 
Information about energy efficiency and/or GHG 
emissions  is  routinely  gathered  when  making 
purchasing and investment decisions 
Evidence  that  GHG  emissions  can  determine 
decision making 
1.  Is  your  company  engaging  in  any  voluntary  carbon 
offsetting schemes? 
yes, no, dk, rf   
2. Approximately, what fraction of your GHG emissions do 
you offset? 
3. Do you rely on third party brokers for offsets or do you run 
your own schemes? 
third party, own schemes, 
dk, rf
(a) Do you have any measures in place that are responses to 
actual or expected effects of climate change? 
(b) Can you give examples? 
1-5, dk, rf
Some basic awareness and planning to address 
such risk 
Notes:  E.g.  flood  protection  or  adaptation  to 
higher temperatures trough cooling systems etc.. 
Equally  it  might  include  taking  out  insurance 
against climate change risks 
Wide range of measures in place to respond to 
climate change risks and threats 
  
yes, no, dk, rf
6. Is the firm ultimately owned by a multinational company? 
Country of ultimate owner? 
no, list of countries, dk, rf
10b. (if they can't answer 10) What fraction of your turnover 
are for energy? 
11. Energy Bill 
(only ask if 11 you cannot figure out Q10 directly) 
12. Total running costs (wage cost + materials) 
(only ask if 12 you cannot figure out Q10 directly) 
13. What is the site carbon pollution (if mentioned before that 
they monitor)? (annual; last available figure; in tons of CO2) 
direct, indirect, travel, 
distribution 
14. How many times did you get inspected for compliance 
with environmental regulation by the government in the last 5 
years? 
yes, no, dk, rf
yes, no, dk, rf
22.  What  percentage  of  site  employees  have  a  university 
college degree? X. Post Interview 
1. Interview duration (mins)  #
2. Interviewers' impression of interviewee's reliability  1
3
5
3. Interviewee seemed concerned about climate change  1 Not concerned 
3 Somewhat 
5 Very concerned 
4. Interviewee seemed skeptic about action on climate change  1 Not sceptic at all 
3 Somewhat sceptic 
5 Very sceptic 
4. Mentioned other climate change related policies  text box
5. Moaned a lot about high energy prices  no, a little, a lot
6. Number of times rescheduled (0=never)  #
7. Seniority of interviewee 
1-6
1 Director 
2 VP/General Manager 
3 Plant/Factory Manager 
4 Manufacturing/Production Manager 
5 Technician 
6 (Environmental), Health & Safety Manager 
8. Age of interviewee (don't ask, guess!)  #
9. Gender of interviewee  male, female
1-5, dk, rf
Some  knowledge  about  his  site,  and  no 
knowledge about the rest of the firm 
Expert  knowledge  about  his  site,  and  some 
knowledge about the rest of the firm 
Expert knowledge about his site and the rest of 
the firm 
1-5, dk, rf
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